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APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF MULTIATTRIBUTE DECISION ANALYSIS
A.1 General Remarks
The purpose of this Appendix is to present a brief
summary of the elements of multiattribute decision analy-
sis. Multiattribute decision analysis addresses decision
problems which involve simultaneous satisfaction of several
objectives which often are conflicting. In particular,
this theory is designed to help a decision maker (or de-
cision unit) make a choice among a set of prespecified
alternatives, where the consequences of choosing a par-
ticular alternative can be expressed in terms of the levels
that a number of "indices of value" or"attributes" attain.
We can divide these decision problems into two categories;
namely, those that involve decisions under certainty and
those that involve decisions under uncertainty. The for-
mer are those for which the consequences of each alterna-
tive are well-defined; that is, the outcome of a partic-
ular course of action can be predetermined. The latter
are those for which the consequences of some alternatives
are uncertain; that is_ the outcome of a particular course
of action cannot be deterministically predetermined. What
it is known, however, is the probability with which each
possible outcome will obtain.
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The theory of multiattribute decision analysis is
developed by R.L. Keeney and H. Raiffa in Ref [6]. This
Appendix is liberally adapted from their work. The cer-
tainty problem is described in section A.2 while the un-
certainty problem is described in section A.3.
A.2. Multiattribute Preferences Under Certainty:- Value
Function
Decision analysis under certainty addresses the pro-
blem of establishing the relevant preferences of the decision
maker for each possible outcome. Since each alternative
course of action is uniquely related to an outcome, a pre-
ference structure over the outcomes implies a preference
structure over the alternatives.
Some symbolism will be helpful at this point. We
denote an alternative by a and the set of all possible
alternatives;, by A. With each a we associate the n indices
of value or attributes X(a), X2(a), . . . Xn(a). As ex-
plained in Chapter III each attribute Xi refers to a general
property of a (e.g. cost, development time) and is associated
with an evaluator x-i which measures this attribute (e.g.
dollars, years). These n attributes constitute, therefore,
a mapping of A into a n-dimensional space which we call
evaluation space. It is noteworthy that given a point
(x1 , ..., xn ) in the evaluation space, the magnitudes of -i and
x. for i j cannot be cmp-ared since they are usually expres-
130
sed in different units e.g, dollars, years, radiation
units). There is a need therefore for the specification
of an index that combines Xl(c), ..., Xn(a) into a scalar
index of preferability or value. Alternatively stated,
it is adequate to specify a scalar-valued function v
defined on the evaluation space with the property thatV(Xl,X 2, ...Xn) > V(X 1 , . ,Xn). (Xl,...Xn)
where the symbol ) reads "preferredor indifferent to".
We refer to the function v as a value-function. Other
names used in the literature are: ordinal utility function,
preference-function or worth function.
Given the value function v, the problem reduces into
the one'of ordering the a's in A, in a descending order of
values v.
A.2.1. Dominance and the Efficient Frontier.
For convenience in the following we assume that
preferences increase in each xi.
We say that x' dominates x" whenever
(a) xi - xl all i A.1
(b) x! > x'! for some i A.21 1
If x' dominates x" then obviously a' is preferred to a"
since a' is at least as good as a" for every evaluator
[see Eq. A.1] and strictly better for at least one [see
Eq. A.2].
131
Let R be the set of all points in the n-dimensional eva-
luation space that corresponds to all alternatives a in A.
We call the set of points in R that are not dominated, the
efficient frontier of R. It is also known as "Pareto op-
timal set". The efficient frontier is illustrated for a
2-dimensional case in Figure A.1 with the heavy line. It is
noteworthy that each point inside R is dominated by at
least one point in the efficient frontier.
Figure A.1 Eff 2-dimensional case.
The determination of the efficient. frontier of the problem
is the formal expression for the screening process that
was mentioned in Section IV.6. The result of this proce-
dure is the identification of the alternatives that are
to be ranked using the value function .
A.2.2. Preference structure, Indifference Surfaces and
Value Function.
In a formal approach to the construction of the value
function it is assumed that in the opinion of the decision
maker, any two points x' and x" are comparable in the sense
that one, and only one of the following holds:
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(a) x' is indifferent to x" (x' '\ x")
(b) x' is preferred to x" (x' > x")
(c) x' is less preferred than x" (x' < x")
All three relations (a), (b) and.(c) are assumed transi-
tive.
A preference structure is then defined on the eva-
luation space if any two points are comparable and no in-
transitivities exist.
For each point x, all the points that are indifferent
to it, define an indifference surface. Once defined, the
indifference surfaces can be ranked in order of increasing
preferences. The "optimum" alternative a* is then the one
that corresponds to the point x of the efficient frontier
that belongs to the indifference surface of the highest
value.
A function v, which associates a real number v(x) to
each point x in an evaluation space, is said to be a value
function representing the decision maker's preference
structure, provided that
x' x" v(x') = v(x")
A.4
x' x v(x') > v(x-')
If v is a value function reflecting the decision maker's
preferences, then his problem can be put into the format of
the standard optimization problem: find asA to maximize
v[X(a)].
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Given a value function v(x) the indifference sur-
faces are defined and, therefore, the preference structure
in the evaluation space is uniquely defined. The converse,
however, is not true: a preference structure does not uni-
quely specify a value function.
The value functions v and v2 are strategically equi-
valent, written v1 ' v2 , if v1 and v2 have the same indif-
ference surfaces and induced preference structure. It can
be shown that if T(.) is any strictly monotonically incre-
asing real-valued function (of a real variable) and if
v2 (x) = T[v l(x) ], then it is immaterial whether we choose
acA to maximize vl or v2. In other words v1 and v2 are
strategically equivalent.
For example, if all xi are positive and
vl(x) kixi ki > 0 all i
i
then
v2 ( x ) = kiXi
and V3(X) = log(j kxi)
would be strategically equivalent to v1. All these functions
are representations of the same preference structure. In-
deed for operational purposes, given v we will want to choose
T such that the value function T(v) is easy to manipulate
mathematically.
From the above discussion it follows that the whole
problem is equivalent to the one of defining the indifference
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surfaces in the evaluation space. Keeney and Raiffa [6]
present procedures for the systematic definition of the
indifference surfaces by "asking" the decision maker to
define points on these surfaces. In the 2-dimensional
case for example, one such procedure consists in asking the
decision maker to assess, starting from a point x'(x[,x2),
how great a change in x2 would compensate for a given change
in xl, and thus, producing a new point x" on the indiffer-
ence curve through x'. In the limit, for small changes,
this procedure results in the definition of the marginal
rate of substitution of x1 for x2 at x'. This procedure
can be generalized for the multi-dimensional case. The
difficulty of the assessment increases, however, with the
dimensionality (number of attributes of the problem).
A.2.3 Property Identification
The definition of the indifference surfaces and,
therefore, of v(x) becomes easier if general properties
of v(x) are known beforehand. Thus, it is advantageous
to first consider such general properties as representation,
monotonicity, and concavity. Keeney and Raiffa present a
number of representation theorems (mainly from measure-
ment theory) that break down the assessment of the value
function into component parts. These theorems are presented
in terms of properties of the preference structure induced
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by the decision maker in the evaluation space. Basically,
all the simplifications are based on the preference-inde-
pendence property that might exist among various subsets
of attributes.
Definition. The set of attributes Y is preferentially
independent of the complementary set Z if and only if the
conditional preference structure in the y-space given z',
does not depend on z'. An important result can be cast in
the form of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the set Y = {xl, ... , xs} is preferentially
indendendent of the complementary set Z = {xs+l, ..., xn
then
V(yZ) = f(Vy(Y), s ... , xn). A5
In other words the value function vy(y) can' b constructed
in the y-space without worrying about the exact value of z.
Then the value function v(y,z) depends on only through the
aggregator vy(V). If in addition the set z is preferen-
tially independent of Y,the value function has the form
v(y,z) = f[v (y), vz(Z)]. A.6
Another important representation theorem states that
Theorem 2. If Y, Z are subsets of the set S of attributes
such that
YUZ S and YnZ Z $
and Y and Z are preferentially independent of their respec-
tive complements,then the sets
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(i) yvZ
(ii ) YnZ
(iii) Y-Z and Z-Y
(iv) (Y-Z)U(Z-Y)
are each preferentially independent of their respective
complements. The simplest representation of a value fun-
ction occurs whenever the attributes are mutually prefer-
entially independent. Definition: The attributes X1,...,xn are
mutually preferentially independent if every subset y of those
attributes is preferentially independent of its complementary
set of attributes.
Theorem 3. Given attributes x,...,x n n > 3 an addi-
tive value function
v(x1 , 2, ... , Xn) = X ivi(xi)
(where vi is a value function over X i scaled from 0 to 1
n 1
and I X=l, X >0 all i) exists if and only if the attri-i=l i
butes are mutually preferentially independent.
From theorem 2 above it follows that: If every pair
of attributes is preferentially independent of its comple-
mentary set, then the attributes are mutually preferentially
independent. The existence of preferentially independent
sets of attributes results, therefore, in a significant re-
duction of the complexity of the problem. Thus during the
property identification phase of the value function assess-
ment we seek to identify preferentially independent sub.-
sets of' attributes. Of course, in practice, it would
not be reasonable to check directly for all possible
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preferential independence conditions. The nature of the
problem, however, usually suggests groups for which the
preference independence conditions should be checked. One
general guideline is to divide the set of attributes into
natural groups of attributes; i.e., attributes measured
in the same or similar units. For our problem such
groups could be monetary-attributes, time-attributes, dif-
ficulty-attributes, etc. Another possible method is to try to
identify preferentially independent sets of attributes
starting with sets that correspond to higher levels in the
objective hierarchy (see Chanter III). Then, this proce-
dure is repeated within each of the sets defined in the
previous step, etc., until the lowest level objectives
have been reached.
An example of property identification procedure is
given in Appendix B. Examples of value function assess-
ments are given in Appendices B and E.
A.3. Multiattribute Preferences Under Uncertainty: Utility
Function.
Decision analysis under uncertainty addresses the
problem of establishing the relevant preferences of a de-
cision maker under uncertainty. In particular, since now
each alternative is not associated with a unique outcome,
but rather with a robability distribution over the out-
comes, decision analysis under uncertainty consists in
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establishing the preferences of the decision maker over
probability distributions.
Using the symbolism of the previous section where
xi designates a specific label of Xi, our task is to assess
a utility function u(x) = u(xl, x2, ..., xn ) over the n
attributes. The utility function u has the characteristic
property that, given two probability distributions A and B
over the multiattribute consequences x , probability dis-
tribution A is at least as desirable as B if and only if
EA[u ()] > EB[U ()] A.9
where EA and EB are the usual expectation operators taken
with respect to distribution measures A and B, respectively.
This asserts that expected utility is the appropriate
criterion to use in choosing among alternatives.
As a special degenerate case of Eq.A.9 we conclude that
outcome xA is at least as desirable as xB if and only if
u(xA ) > u(x B). A.10
(2)
This means that a utility function is also a value function
The reverse is not true, however.
A.3.1 Property Identification
The assessment of a utility function u(x) includes
the assessment of the preferences of the decision maker
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oyer lotteries involving the x's; i.e., over risky options
yielding payoffs in terms of the x's. The direct assess-
ment of u(x) becomes more and more difficult as the dimen-
sion of x and the number of possible x-outcomes increases.
This assessment can be facilitated, however, if some in-
formation about the functional form of u(x) is available.
The basic approach utilized by Keeney and Raiffa
in Ref [61 is: (1) to postulate various sets of assumptions
about the basic preference attitudes of the decision maker,
and (2) to derive functional forms of the multiattribute
utility function consistent with these assumptions. In
practice, this means that it must first be verified whether
some of the assumptions are valid for the particular prob-
lem at hand; then a utility function consistent with the
varified assumptions must be assessed. Ideally, a repre-
sentation of the utility function is sought such that
u(x1, x2, ... , x) = f[fl(x1), f2(x2 ), . fn(xn)] A.11
where fi is a function of attribute Xi only, for i = 1,2,
..., n, and where f has a simple form, an additive or multi-
plicative form, for example. When this is possible, the
assessment of u can be greatly simplified.
The fundamental concept of multiattribute utility
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theory upon which the various utility representations are
based, is that of utility independence. Its role in multi-
attribute utility theory is similar to that of probabilistic
independence in multivariate probability theory.
Let Y and Z denote two subsets of attributes.
Definition. Y is utility independent of Z if conditional
preferences for lotteries on Y given z do not depend on
the articular level of z.
For example, let Y and Z contain only one attribute each.
Furthermore, let us suppose that the decision maker asserted
that he is indifferent between a certain option yielding
(y, z) and a risky otion yielding (l, z) with 50% chance
and (Y2, z0 ) also with 50% chance; i.e.,
(Y, 1 z)
(y2 , z)
If now the decision maker asserts that the y value does
not change when we shift the z-value from z to another
level, say z', and, in general, if he asserts that the y
value depends only on Yl, Y2, and the associated probabi-
lities and this is true for any fixed yl, Y2 then, we say
that the attribute Y is utility independent of the attri-
bute Z.
If Y is utility independent of Z and Z is utility
independent of Y then we say that Y and Z are mutually
utility indepdendent.
141
Keeney and Raiffa present in Ref. 6] numerous simplifi-
cations of the form of the utility function that result
from various degrees of utility independence among the
attributes of a particular problem. The simplification
that is of interest to our work is the one that involves
the use of certainty equivalents.
A.3.2 Use of Certainty Euivalents
As stated in section IV.5.2, the certainty equi-
valent of a single attribute Y is the value which, in
the opinion of the decision maker, is equivalent to the
uncertain option y. In a multiattribute decision problem
each alternative is associated with an uncertain outcome
which is characterized by a multivariate random veriable x.
The certainty equivalent x would be the solution of the
equation.
u(x) = Eu(x)1
where the expectation E is taken with repsect to the joint
measure of x. Such an assessment requires the prior know-
ledge of the multiattribute utility function u(x). Never-
theless, the certainty equivalent x can be easily assessed
in cases that are formally described in the following theorem.
Theorem. The certainty equivalent x for a lottery x is
given by
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= (XlX 2, ... , Xn)
where xi (i=1,2,...n) is the certainty equivalent for
the one-dimensional variable xl, calculated using the mar-
ginal probability distribution on xi, provided that the
attributes xi are: (a) mutually utility independent, and
(b) probabilistically independent.
In other words, if the preferences of the decision
maker for lotteries involving one attribute and the prob-
ability distribution over this attribute do not depend
on the levels of the other attributes, and if this is true
for each and every attribute, then we can approach the
decision problem as follows. First, n one-dimensional
utility functions ui(xi ) (i=1,2,...n) are assessed. Next,
for each alternative the n certainty equivalents
(i = 1,2,...,n) are assessed using the appropriate mar-
ginal probability distributions. In this manner, the un-
certain outcome of each alternative is replaced by a cer-
A A A A
tain_outcQme-;__name ! _x _xl, x , Xn), and the decision
problem has been reduced into one under certainty. If a
value function is defined over the x's, the ranking of
of the alternatives can be achieved in terms of this value
function and of the certainty equivalents. Of course, all
the qualitative arguments using dominance and extended domin-
ance (see Section IV.6.) are also valid.
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APPENDIX B
INHERENT DIFFICULTY IN THE CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL TO WEAPONS - USABLE FORM
B. 1 General Remarks
The purpose of this Appendix is to develop a scale
for the attribute: inherent difficulty. As discussed in
Section III.3.3, this attribute provides a measure of the
degree of difficulty of the proliferation effort due to
problems encountered in the conversion of fuel cycle mate-
rials to weapons usable form. Since a conventional measure
for the degree of difficulty, e.g., cost or time, does not
exist, this attribute needs to be decomposed into measurable
sub-attributes.
B.2 Decomposition into measurable attributes
The fissile material contained in nuclear fuel may
not be directly usable in nuclear explosives. In most cases,
it must be "purified" to a certain degree by removing various
kinds of' unwanted material. In general, this "purification"
involves chemical separation of different elements and/or
isotopic separation of the fissile from the non-fissile
uranium isotopes. Thus, we can say that the difficulty in
nuclear material conversion is reduced, if the difficulty
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involved in the chemical and/or isotopic separation of the
material is reduced. Therefore, the inherent difficulty can
be decomposed into two components.
(1) Difficulty of chemical separation
(2) Difficulty of isotopic separation.
A potential proliferator using either of these tech-
niques is faced with difficulties due partly to problems
present in every industrial process and stemming from the
associated scientific and technological complexity, and
partly to problems stemming from the unique nuclear nature
of these processes. A logical measure of the former problem
is the availability of relevant information or "know-how"
in the country in question, and of the latter, the radio-
activity and criticality problems potentially present in the
processes. We can, therefore, say that the difficulty of
the chemical or the isotopic separation can be measured by
the following three attributes.
(1) Status of information
(2) Degree of radioactivity
(3) Criticality problems
The inherent difficulty is thus decomposed into six
sub-attributes (see figure B.1) which are discussed in the
following subsections.
Status of information: The status of information refers to
the existence and availability of the necessary "know-how"
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Figure B.1. Decomposition of the attribute inherent difficulty.
TABLE B.1
States of Information. Science and Technology Levels: lEKnown;
2EReadily Available; 3Unknown and/or classified.
STATE S
OF SC ENCE TECHNOLOGY
T ,, , , 'T IT ! - '
A 1 1
B 1 2
C 1 3
D 2 1
E 2 2
F 2 3
G 3 1
H 3 2
I 3 3
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for the process in question. This information must be
acquired by the prospective proliferator in order to succeed
in separating the fissile material from the fuel. Informa-
tion can be acquired by developing indigenous expertise
and/or employing "foreign" experts.
There are two kinds of information pertaining to any
industrial process:
(1) Scientific information dealing with the basic principles
(physical laws and theories) on which the process is based;
and (2) Technological information dealing with the imple-
mentation of the theoretical principles into an actual
production process.
The status of each of these two kinds of information
can be characterized by one of the following three levels.
Level 1: KNOWN
Level 2: READILY AVAILABLE
Level 3: UNKNOWN AND/OR CLASSIFIED.
Known scientific information means that the basic scientific
principles and descriptions of the process are well under-
stood in the country in question. This implies the existence
of research center(s) and/or universities with active re-
search in the relevant area, as well as the existence of
small laboratories.
Known technological information means that the process is
demonstrated in the country on larger than laboratory scale.
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This assumes the existence of at least a pilot plant for
chemical or isotopic separation of fissile material.
Readily available scientific information refers to informa-
tion that exists in the open literature and to information
that can be acquired by training scientific personnel in
advanced countries (universities and/or government labora-
tories).
Readily available technological information refers to pro-
cesses that have been developed and are used by techno-
logically advanced countries. These countries are, further-
more, willing to transfer the pertinent technological know-
how in the form of aid or trade.
Unknown and/or classified scientific information refers to
information related to processes that have been either
developed by advanced countries but kept classified, or
that have been proposed based on general physical principles,
but, at the moment, lack the necessary scientific research
and development which are required to demonstrate feasibility.
Unknown and/or classified technological information refers
to processes that have not been proved yet on a large scale,
or that have been kept classified.
The combination of the three levels for the scien-
tific and technological information result in 9 possible
states for the attribute: status of information. These
9 states are tabulated in TABLE B.1. Some examples of how
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these states can be used to characterize the status of in-
formation in a particular country follow.
For Japan the status of information for chemical
separation of Pu from spent fuel is A. This means that
relevant processes are well understood and demonstrated in
the country.
For Brazil the status of information for chemical
separation of Pu from spent fuel (in the present "state of
the world") is B. This means that the scientific "know-
how" exists in the country and the technology is readily
available (for example, can be bought).
For Nigeria the status of information for chemical
separation of Pu from spent fuel (in the present "state of
the world") is E. This means that neither the scientific
nor the technological "know-how" exist in the country, but
they can be acquired.
For most countries the status of information relevant
to isotopic enrichment by diffusion is either F or E.
States G and H, and in general states that have the
scientific information in a "higher" level than the tech-
nological information, correspond to situations in which a
country has relevant industrial activities but it has not
developed the aspect of the technology that can be used in
the fissile material separation. For example, a country
might have a strong laser-related industry and yet the
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information concerning laser enrichment could be classified
or unknown.
Scale of status of information. As discussed in section
III.2, the decomposition of a sub-objective stops whenever
an operational measure of effectiveness of this sub-objective
exists. Furthermore, we saw in the previous subsection that
the status of information can be in any of nine possible
states. Therefore, the first step in the development of
a scale for the status of information would be to order
these nine states in terms of increasing difficulty. We
can then think of the status of information as a discrete
variable i that can take nine values (i=1,2,...,9), i.e.,
we can think of a mapping d(X)=i of the nine states
(X=A,...,I) to the nine integers (i=l,...,9). Thus a state
X would be more difficult than Y, if and only if d(X) > d(Y).
Of course, this scaling represents only an ordinal ordering
of the states in terms of increasing difficulty and not a
cardinal ordering. If, for example d(X) = 6 and d(Y) = 3,
we know that Y represents an easier state than X but we
don't know how much easier. A cardinal ordering of the
states will result from the assessment of the preferences
of the proliferator about the various states. The generation
of the ordinal scale for the status of information is pre-
sented in Section B.4 while the assessment of a cardinal
scale is in Section B.6.
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Radioactivity. The second measure of the inherent diffi-
culty in the separation of the fissile material is the
radioactivity of the materials involved in the separation
process. This activity measured 1 meter from the material
can be anywhere from less than 10 rad/hr (cold) up to 106
rads/hr (very hot). Obviously the higher the radioactivity
the more difficult the separation process.
Criticality Problems. The third measure of the inherent
difficulty is the potential for criticality accidents
during the separation of the fissile material. The extent
to which such problems exist depends on the particular
material and on the size of the facility in use.
For the purposes of this analysis two values of
this attribute have been assumed: (1) High criticality
problems; and (2) Low criticality problems.
B.3 Index of Inherent Difficulty
The attribute: inherent difficulty can be decomposed
(as seen in the previous section) into six measurable sub-
attributes. A value function assessed on these six sub-
attributes can serve as a subjective index for the inherent
difficulty. This index can then be used either in assessing
a value function over the five attributes of the prolifera-
tion resistance (see Appendix E) or for simple intercomparisons
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of two pathways.
In principle, this procedure could present two
problems: First, the use of an aggregate index for in-
herent difficulty assumes the existence of preferential
independence (See Appendix A) among the set Z of the in-
herent difficulty sub-attributes and the remaining 4
attributes of the proliferation resistance. Secondly,
even if preferential independence exists, a particular
value of this index is not necessarily intuitively meaning-
ful, and thus may not be useful for tradeoffs with other
attributes. For the present application the first prob-
lem is not very serious. From preliminary assessments it
seems very probable that the set of the inherent difficulty
sub-attributes is preferentially independent of the other
proliferation resistance attributes. Even if it turns out
that this is not always true, ranges of the attributes
for which preferential independence exists can be found,
and the problem can be solved repeatedly in each of these
ranges. The second problem, however, might present serious
difficulties. This is because it is highly improbable that
statements of the sort: "How much, in terms of attribute x,
is a change in inherent difficulty from .5 to .6 worth?"
will be meaningful to the decision maker. The .5 and .6
values are meaningful only up to monotone transformations.
This is not due to the lack of operational procedures for
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the structure of isopreference curves between the aggre-
gate attribute of inherent difficulty and any other
attributes; these do exist, however, tradeoffs between in-
herent difficulty and other attributes might not be meaning-
ful to a decision maker even though the inherent difficulty
is precisely defined in terms of the six attributes. This
could happen if the decision maker, whose preferences about
time, money and difficulty must be assessed, is an individual
who lacks the requisite technical background. It follows,
therefore, that there is a need of a measure of the difficulty
that will make sense to the rather non-technically minded
decision maker. Such a measure could be the probability
of successful completion of the task, conditional on the
absence of outside intervention. Such a probability measure
can be developed by technical experts combining the inherent
difficulty index with the difficulty in the weapon design
and fabrication.
In the remaining of this Appendix we demonstrate how
a value function can be assessed over the sub-attributes
of inherent difficulty. Furthermore, we use this value
function to cardinally rank a number of proliferation path-
ways in terms of decreasing inherent difficulty. This
ranking is then compared with an ordinal ranking provided
by SAI2].
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B.4 Questionnaire for Development of an Ordinal Scale
for the Status of Information for Isotopic Separation
The 9 states of information characterizing the
isotopic separation of weapons material are given in
TABLE B.1. We want to rank these states in order of in-
creasing difficulty. In other words, we want to generate
a correspondence between the 9 states and the nine integers
1,2,...9 where 1 corresponds to state A, 9 to state I and
if i>j, the state that corresponds to i represents a more
difficult situation than the state that corresponds to j.
For each of the following pairs of states of informa-
tion, indicate the state that in your opinion represents the
lesser difficulty, and hence, is more preferred. For
example, if you think that:
(a) H represents a less difficult state than F, then d(H)<d(F)
(b) H represents an equally difficult state as F, then d(H)=d(F)
(c) H represents a more difficult state than F, then d(H)>d(F)
Please compare:
9
Q.1 H versus F d(H) < d(F)
Q.2 H versus C d(H) > d(C)
Q.3 G versus F d(G) < d(F)
Q.4 G versus E d(G) > d(E)
Q.5 G versus C d(G) < d(C)
Q.6 G versus B d(G) > d(B)
Q.7 E versus C d(E) < d(C)
Q.8 ID versus C d(D) < d(C)
Q.9 D versus B d(D) < d(B)
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'To order the 9 states of information in terms of de-
creasing difficulty (92)=36 comparisons are required. From
the definition of the states, however, the relations be-
tween the elements of 27 of those pairs are uniquely defined.
The remaining 9 are determined by answering Questions Q.1
through Q.9. A sample response and the resultant ordering
are given below. (The obvious relations of the states with
I and A are omitted.)
H G F E
Q.l? H > F v F D
H < E F C
H < D F B
Q.2? :H C ' E < D
H B Q.7? E> C v
Q.3? G F E B
Q.4? G< E V Q.8? D > C V
GS (D Q.9? D >B v
Q.5? G "' C B
Q.6? 3<1 B 
Resulting ordering:
! ! t ! - t t t t t !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(A) (3) (b) (E) ( ) C) (H) (f) (I)
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B.5 Questionnaire for Development of an Ordinal Scale for
the Status of Information for Chemical Separation
The 9 states of information characterizing the
chemiQal separation of weapons material are given in
TABLE B.1. We want to rank these states in order of in-
creasing difficulty. In other words, we want to generate
a correspondence between the 9 states and the nine integers
1,2,...9 where 1 corresponds to state A, 9 to state I and
if i>j, the state that corresponds to i represents a more
difficult situation than the state that corresponds to j.
For each of the following pairs of states of informa-
tion, indicate the state that in your opinion represents the
lesser difficulty, and hence, is more preferred. For
example, if you think that:
(a) H represents a less difficult state than F, then d(H)<d(F)
(b) H represents an equally difficult state as F, then d(H)=d(F)
(c) H represents a more difficult state than F, then d(H)>d(F)
Please compare:
Q.1 H versus F d(H) G d(F).
Q.2 H versus C d(H) > d(C)
Q.3 G versus F d(G) 4 d(F)
Q.4 G versus E d(G) > d(E)
Q.5 G versus C d(G) < d(C)
Q.6 G versus B d(G) > d(B)
Q.7 E versus C d(E) < d(C)
Q.8 D versus C d(D) < d(C)
Q.9 D versus B d(D) < d(B)
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To order the 9 states of information in terms of de-
creasing difficulty (9)=36 comparisons are required. From
the definition of the states, however, the relations be-
tween the elements of 27 of those pairs are uniquely defined.
The remaining 9 are determined by answering Questions Q.1
through Q.9. A sample response and the resultant ordering
are given below. (The obvious relations of the states with
I and A are omitted.)
H G F E
Q.l? H > F / F D
H E F C
H D Fg B
Q.2? H C v E < D
H B Q.7? E C L"
Q.3? G F E,(B
Q.4? G E Q.8? D > C 
G< D Q.9? D >B '
Q.5? G > C C < B
Q.6? G <B V
Resulting ordering:
-t!- t I T 1 t t ! t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(A) ()c) (I)
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B.6 Testing for Preferential Independence for the
Inherent-Difficulty Attributes
We consider the LWR-Denatured Thorium cycle with
reactors only allowed to operate in a country of Type B
(See Section IV.2). The nuclear weapons aspiration is
10 weapons of military quality in one year (a2 ).
The following questions consider tradeoffs between
the cost attribute and the sub-attributes of inherent
difficulty. The levels of the remaining attributes (De-
velopment Time, Warning Period, and Weapons Material) will
be held constant at pre-specified values. Thus, an alterna-
tive will be denoted by
{x, z1, z2,' . z6}
where
x : denotes the cost
z1: the status of information for chemical separation
z2 ' the radioactivity level for chemical separation
z3: the level of the criticality problems for
chemical separation
z4: the status of information for isotopic separation
z5: the radioactivity level for isotopic separation
z6: the level of the criticality problems for
isotopic separation
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For the following questions, the attributes: Development
Time (x1), Warning Period (x2) and Weapons Material (x4)
have the following values:
x1 = 4 years
X2 = 10%
x4 = H.E. Uranium-233
We consider a pathway that consists in seizing the
spent fuel, separating chemically the Uranium from the
Thorium and Pu, and then, enriching the fuel in U-233.
For an all-covert mode of operation the inherent
difficulty attributes have the following values:
Zl=B, z2 =106 rad/hr, z3=HIGH, z4 =C, z5=102 rad/hr, z6=HIGH,
and the cost of this operation is $100 million. The pertinent
questions which test for preferential independence and sample
responses are given below.
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Define the amount of money for which you would be indifferent
between the following alternatives.
1. {100$M, B, 10 , HIGH, C, 10 , HIGH}%{ O©O , B, 106, HIGH, A, 10 , HIGH}
2. {100$M, B, 106, HIGH, C, 102, HIGH}%{ -io , B, 106, HIGH, C, 0, HIGH}
3. {100$M, B, 106, HIGH, C, 102, HIGH}%{ io5 , B, 106 , HIGH, C, 102, LOW }
4. {100$M, B, 10 , HIGH, C, 10 HIGH}b{ 420 , A, 106, HIGH, C, 102, HIGH}
5. {100$M, B, 10 , HIGH, C, 102, HIGH}%{ 40 , B, 0, HIGH, C, 102, HIGH}
6. {100$M, B, 106, HIGH LOW, C, 10 2 , HIGH}
Let us call the pathway we are examining pathway I. We now consider
a variation of this pathway: Pathway II has exactly the same values for
the attributes Development Time, Warning Period, Weapons Material, and Cost
as pathway I but now reprocessing of the fuel is not necessary before en-
richment. (This corresponds to using the fresh, denatured fuel as source
material.)
For pathway II please answer the following questions.
7. {100$M, , , , C, 102, HIGH}%{ .O , - , , A, 102, HIGH}
8. {100$M, , - , -, C, 102, HIGH)b{ - iC ,-,- ,- , C, 0, HIGH}
9. {100$M, ,- , - , C, 102, HIGH}\{ o , - -,-, C, 102, LOW}
Finally, we consider a third variation of pathway I, pathway III,
which has exactly the same values as pathway I, for the attributes Devel-
opment Time, Warning Period, Weapons Material, and Cost but now enrichment
of the material is not necessary. In this case, we assume that after re-
processing the material is exchanged with enriched fuel without having
to do the enrichment ourselves.
For pathway III please answer the following questions.
10. {100$M, B, 106, HIGH, -,--,--,}{ i2 , A, 106, HIGH, , -,-}
11. {100$M, B, 106, HIGH, -,- -,}%{ 140 B, 0, HIGH , ,}
12. {100$M, B, 106 HIGH? , -,}%{ AO, B, 10 , LOW , }HIH ---- ,,)L · 0~ , 'I1 O , ·
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Are your answers in questions #1 and #7 the same?
1. [VL YES: Is it always true that the amount of money you
would be willing to spend in order to achieve a
certain reduction in the difficulty involved with
the status of information of the isotopic separa-
tion of the weapons material does not depend on
the level of the difficulty associated with the
chemical separation?
1.1 V1 YES => Cost & status of information Prefer-
entially Independent (P.I.) of the
chemical difficulty
1.2 O N =4 Go to 2.1.
2. 1= NO: Were you aware that these questions involved the
same tradeoff between cost and status of information
for isotopic separation but at different levels of
difficulty for the chemical separation?
2.1 I- YES ZZExplain in which way tradeoffs between
money and status of information depend on
the level of difficulty of the chemical
separation.
2.2 ) NO .Do you still feel that the value of
going from C to A in questions #1 and
#7 is different?
2.2.1 IYES z Go to 2.1.
2.2.2 _ NO =Go to 1.
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Are your answers in questions #2 and #8 the same?
1. V YES
2. 1 NO
Is it always true that the amount of money you
would be willing to spend in order to achieve a
certain reduction in the difficulty involved with
the radioactivity of the isotopic separation of
the weapons material does not depend on the level
of the difficulty associated with the chemical
separation?
1.1 ] YES = Cost & radioactivity Preferentially
Independent (P.I.) of the chemical
difficulty
1.2 - NO Go to 2.1.
D: Were you aware that these questions involved the
same tradeoff between cost and radioactivity for
isotopic separation but at different levels of
difficulty for the chemical separation?
2.1 YES = Explain in which way tradeoffs between
money and radioactivity depend on the
level of difficulty of the chemical
separation.
2.2 I- NO Do you still feel that the value of
going from 102 to 0 in questions #2 and
#8 is different?
2.2.2.1 = YES Go to 2.1.
2.2.2 O N = Go to 1.
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I
Are your answers in questions #3 and #9 the same?
1. ± YES
2. NC
Is it always true that the amount of money you
would be willing to spend in order to achieve a
certain reduction in the difficulty involved with
the criticality problems of the isotopic separation
of the weapons material does not depend on the level
of the difficulty associated with the chemical
separation?
1.1 M YES = Cost & criticality problems Preferentially
Independent (P.I.) of the chemical dif-
ficulty
1.2 1 NO == Go to 2.1.
D: Were you aware that these questions involved the
same tradeoff between cost and criticality problems
for isotopic separation but at different levels of
difficulty for the chemical separation?
2.1 - YES -= Explain in which way tradeoffs between
2.2 
money and criticality problems depend on
the level of difficulty of the chemical
separation.
NO = Do you still feel that the value of
going from HIGH to LOW in questions #3
and #9 is different?
2.2.1 I YES ~=fGo to 2.1.
2.2.2 NO Q Go to 1.
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Are your answers in questions #4 and #10 the same?
1.| [7i YES: Is it always true that the amount of money you
would be willing to spend in order to achieve a
certain reduction in the difficulty involved with
the status of information of the chemical separa-
tion of the weapons material does not depend on
the level of the difficulty associated with the
isotopic separation?
1.1 t YES =V Cost & status of information Prefer-
entially Independent (P.I.) of the
isotopic difficulty
1.2 - NO = Go to 2.1.
2.1 I NO: Were you aware that these questions involved the
same tradeoff between cost and status of information
for chemical separation but at different levels of
difficulty for the isotopic separation?
2.1 a YES = Explain in which way tradeoffs between
money and status of information depend
on the level of difficulty of the
isotopic separation.
2.2 -- NO Do you still feel that the value of
going from B to A in questions #4 and
#10 is different?
2.2.1 l FYES = Go to 2.1.
2.2.2 - NO o Go to 1.
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Are your answers in questions #5 and #11 the same?
1. YES: Is it always true that the amount of money you
would be willing to spend in order to achieve a
certain reduction in the difficulty involved with
the radioactivity of the chemical separation of
the weapons material does- not depend on the level
of the difficulty, associated with the isotopic
separation?
1.1 V YES = Cost & radioactivity Preferentially
Independent (P.I.) of the isotopic
difficulty,
1.2 O N a Go to 2.1.
2.1 f- NO: Were you aware that these questions involved the
same tradeoff between cost and radioactivity' for
chemical separation but at different levels- of
difficulty for the isotopic separation?
2.1 YES Explain in which way tradeoffs between
money and radioactivity depend on the
level of difficulty of the isotopic
separation.
2.2 NO s Do you still feel that the value of
going from 106 to 0 in questions #5
and #12 is different?
2.2.1 l1j YES 1= Go to 2.1.
2.2.2 O N  .t Go to i.
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Are your answers in questions #6 and #12 the same?
1. |tf YES: Is it always true that the amount of money you
would be willing to spend in order to achieve a
certain reduction in the difficulty involved with
the criticality problems of the chemical separation
of the weapons material does not depend on the level
of the difficulty associated with the isotopic
separation?
1.1 YES ~= Cost & criticality problems Preferentially
Independent (P.I.) of the isotopic
difficulty
1.2 NO = Go to 2.1.
2.1 NO: Were you aware that these questions involved the
same tradeoff between cost and criticality problems
for chemical separation but at different levels of
difficulty for the isotopic separation?
2.1 YES -= Explain in which way tradeoffs between
money and criticality problems depend
on the level of difficulty of the
isotopic separation.
2.2 NO = Do you still feel that the value of
going from HIGH to LOW in questions #6
and #12 is different?
2.2.1 __ YES - Go to 2.1.
2.2.2.2 NO =~ Go to 1.
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If I were to change the levels of the attributes:
Development Time, Warning Period, and Weapons Material from
the values they had before to:
Development Time x1 = 2 years
Warning Period x2 = 1%
Weapons Material x4 = H.E. Uranium-235
would your questions 1 to 3 change?
Question 1: 1. -YES:
2. m NO:
Explain why you feel that the
value of going from C to A in the
status of information for isotopic
separation is different.
Would it be correct to say that the
additional amount of money you would
pay for a particular change in the
status of information for the iso-
topic separation depends only on
the initial level of cost and on
the initial and final states of the
information and on nothing else?
2.1 YES => Cost & Status of Informa-
tion for isotopic separa-
tion P.I.
2.2 = NO Elaborate.
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Question 2: 1. 0 YES:
2. NO:
Question 3: 1. m YES:
2. NO:
Explain why you feel that the value
of reducing by 102 rad/hr the radio-
activity level in the isotopic separa-
tion is different under the present
circumstances:
Would it be correct to say that the
additional amount of money you would
pay for a particular reduction in the
radioactivity level of the isotopic
separation depends only on the initial
level of cost and on the initial and
final levels of the radioactivity and
on nothing else?
2.1 M YES ~t Cost & Radioactivity for
isotopic separation P.I.
2.2 0j NO = Elaborate.
Explain why you feel that the value
of reducing the criticality problems
in the isotopic separation is dif-
ferent now.
Would it be correct to say that the
additional amount of money you would
pay for the reduction of the criti-
cality problem depends only on the
initial level of cost and on nothing
else?
2.1 LI YES =P Cost & Criticality Problem
for isotopic separation
P.I.
2.2 NO = Elaborate.
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With the new levels of the attributes xl, x2, x4 (x1=2
years, x2=1%, x4=H.E. Uranium-235), would your answers to ques-
tions 4 to 6 change?
Question 4: 1. YES: Explain why you feel that the value
of going from B to A in the status
of information for chemical separa-
tion is now different.
2. i NO: Would it be correct to say that the
additional amount of money you would
pay for a particular change in the
status of information for the chemical
separation depends only on the initial
level of cost and on the initial and
final states of the information and
on nothing else?
2.1 V YES i: Cost & Status of Information
for Chemical Separation P.I.
2.2 N O Elaborate.
Question 5: 1. = YES:
2. i NO:
Explain why you feel that the value
of reducing by 106 rad/hr the radio-
activity level in the chemical
separation is different under the
present circumstances.
Would it be correct to say that the
additional amount of money you would
pay for particular reduction in the
radioactivity level of the chemical
separation depends only on the initial
level of cost and on the initial and
final levels of the radioactivity and
on nothing else:
2.1 YES := Cost & Radioactivity of
Chemical Separation P.I.
2.2 fI- NO =* Elaborate.
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Question 6: 1. YES:
2. I NO:
Explain why you feel that the value
of reducing the criticality problems
in the chemical separation is
different now.
Would it be correct to say that the
additional amount of money you would
pay for the reduction of the criti-
cality problems in the chemical separ-
ation depends only on the initial level
of cost and on nothing else?
2.1 YES = Cost & Criticality Problem:
for chemical separation P.I.
2.2 - NO =v Elaborate.
B.7 Value Function Assessment over the Inherent-Difficulty
Attributes
The answers to the questions of the previous section indi-
cate that the set of inherent-difficulty attributes is mutually
preferentially independent (see Appendix A, Sec. A.2.3). It
follows, therefore, that a value function defined over these six
attributes will be of the additive form (see Sec. A.2.3), namely
6
v(z) = Xiv i (Zi) B.1
i=l 1
In this section we present the assessment of the component
value functions vi(zi) (sections B.7.1 to B.7.6) and of the
weighting coefficients Xi (section B.7.7).
2.
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B.7.1 Component Value Function For Radioactivity
In Chemical Separation
The purpose of this section is to assess a value function
for the attribute "radioactivity" for chemical separation. The
range of this attribute is from 0 rad/hr up to 106 rad/hr. Thus,
the use of a logarithmic scale seems appropriate.
We first define certain properties of the function.
A. MONOTONICITY If r represents a level of radioactivity is it
always true that
r>r' implies v(r)<v(r') ?
1.1V1 YES-The function is monotonic.
2. - NO =Describe form of function (Establish regions
of monotonicity) .
B. CONVEXITY AND CONCAVITY
We can determine the shape of the value functions if the
following questions are answered.
For the following pairs of changes in radioactivity
establish the one that corresponds to a larger. increment in
the difficulty.
Q.1. ( 1 - 10 ) . (10 - 102)
Q.2. (10 - 102 ) (10 2- 10 3 )
Q.3. (102 103) (103- 104)
Q.4. (103 104) (104- 105)
Q.5. (104_105) > (105- 106)
Monotonic: ConvexE , Concaven , -Shaped 
No n Monotonic: ShaDe
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C. MIDVALUE SPLITTING TECHNIQUE
We set the value of 1 rad/hr of radioactivity at zero
and the value of 106 rad/hr at -1. i.e.
v(l)=0 and v(10 6)=-1
We want now to establish the levels of radioactivity that
have values of -. 50, -.75, -.25. To do so, we use the midvalue
splitting technique. According to this technique, you are asked
to establish the level of radioactivity r 5 for which you think
that the difficulty in going from a zero level to r 5 is equi-
6valent to the difficulty in going from r S to 106 rad/hr i.e.Q.1. {106'r 53 r r 51} /r 5= -03r h r r
Since v(r )-v(106)=v(1)-v(r 5) v(r 5)=-.
Similarly we establish the -.75 and -.25 values by answering the
following questions.
Q.2. 10r 6 r 7r.| r. x IT 
v(r75 )=-. 75
Q.3. {r -*r .25} r 2 0} r 25= 2r \ bIr
v(r 2S)--.25
Result: S-shaped like normal cumulative function (see Figure B.2)
Radio-
activity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0Value 0 2 -. 16 -. 84 -. 96 -1.
.......... t~~~~________
*Boxed relations represent responses of the decision maker.
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0-0. 2
-0.5(
-0.71
-1. 0
61 2 3
id/hr)
v (E)
Figure B.2. Component Value Function for Radioactivity Level
of Chemical Separation.
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B.7.2. Component Value Function For Status Of Information
For Chemical Separation
The purpose of this section is to assess a value function
for the attribute "status of information" for chemical separation.
This attribute can take 9 discrete values (1 to 9) which have
been already ordered in an ordinal sense. The assessment of a
value function will provide a cardinal ordering for these
values.
We first define certain properties of the function.
A. MONOTONICITY. From the definition of the ordinal scale for
the status of information it follows that the value function
is monotonic i.e.
v(X)>v(Y) if and only if d(X)<d(Y)
where d(X) is the integer (1-9) corresponding to state X(A-I).
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B. CONVEXITY AND CONCAVITY
We consider changes in the status of information and
denote them by (i-l+i) meaning that the status of information
has changed from the state corresponding to (i-l) to the one
corresponding to (i). Then by comparing pairs of such
changes we want to establish which one involves the highest
change in the inherent difficulty.
For example, if
(i-'i)(ii+l) then v(i)-v(i-l) <v(i+l)-v(i)
please
Q.1.
Q.2.
Q.3.
Q.4.
Q.S.
Q.6.
Q.7.
answer the following questions:
(1 2)
(2 + 3)
(3 - 4)
(4 - 5)
(5 . 6)
(6 - 7)
(7 8)
4
(2 - 3)
(3 - 4)
(4 - 5)
(5 + 6)
(6 - 7)
(7 - 8)
(8 ? 9)
MONOTONIC: CONVEX M CONCAVE S-SHAPED 
NONMONOTONIC: SHAPE
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C. MIDVALUE SPLITTING TECHNIQUE
We set the value of 1 (or A) at 0 and the value of
9 (or I) at -1. Thus
v(1) =0 and v(9)=-l
We now want to establish a value i of the status of infor-
mation such that the decrease in difficulty in going from 9 to
i is the same in going from i to 1.
Q.1. l {9.i { -*l
or equivalently define a state X such that
tI-x3 toJ
*
5<i<6
G)X>C
x=5.5
Since the status of information can take only integer
values it might not be possible to identify an i (X) that
satisfies Q.1. In that case we can define a noninteger value x
(i<x<i+l) and artificially put v(X)=-.50. After establishing
the value functions we can go back and check if the values v(i)
v(i+l) agree with the preferences of the assessor.
In the same way we establish the-.25 and-.75 points.
j 9+Yy J Y}
or equivalently define a state Y such that
iI-Y1 ( YX.
v(Y)=-.75
9Q.3. £ip.z 7z 1
or equivalently define a state Z
X+-Z} {Z+A}
such that
v(Z)=-.25
Result:S-Shaped like normal cumulative function (see Figure B.3)
*Boxed relations represent responses of the decision maker.
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Q.2.
and
--- --
Status of Information
A B C E G C H F J
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure B.3. Component Value Functions for Status of
Information for Chemical Separation
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0
-0. 25
-0. 5C
-O. 75
-1.0
B.7.3 Component Value Function For Criticality Problems
For Chemical Separation
The purpose of this section is to assess a value function
for the attribute "criticality problems" for chemical separation.
Since this attribute can take only two values (HIGH LOW), we
simply assign the value of zero to the low level, and the value
of minus unity to the HIGH level. Thus
v(LOW) = v(HIGH) = -1
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B.7.4. Component Value Function For Radioactivity
For Isotopic Separation
The purpose of this section is to assess a value function
for the attribute "radioactivity" for isotopic separation. The
range of this attribute is from 0 rad/hr up to 106 rad/hr. Thus,
the use of a logarithmic scale seems appropriate.
We first define certain properties of the function.
A. MONOTONICITY If r represents a level of radioactivity is it
always true that
r>r' implies v(r)<v(r') ?
1. i YES: The function is monotonic.
2. E NO: Describe form of function (Establish regions
of monotonicity).
B. CONVEXITY AND CONCAVITY
NWe can determine the shape of the value functions if the
following questions are answered.
For the following pairs of changes in radioactivity
establish the one that corresponds to a larger increment in
the difficulty.
Q.1. ( 1 - 10 ) X (10 - 102)
2 2 3Q.2. (10 - 10 ) (10 - 10 )
Q.3. (10 2 103) (lO3- 10 4 )2 3_3 4
Q.4. (103- 104 (104- 105)
Q.5. 1 10 (10 5- 106)
MONOTONIC: CONVEX C CONCAVE D S-SHAPED
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C. IMIDVALUE SPLITTING TECHNIQUE
We set the value of 1 rad/hr of radioactivity at zero
and the value of 106 rad/hr at -1. i.e.
vCl) =0 and v(10 )=-1
We want now to establish the levels of radioactivity that
have values of -.50, -.75, -.25. To do so, we use the midvalue
splitting technique. According to this technique, you are asked
to establish the level of radioactivity r 5 for which you think
that the difficulty in going from a zero level to r is equi-
valent to the difficulty in going from r to 10 6 rad/hr i.e.
Q.1. t106 4rsr t} -
Since v(r 5)-v(10 6)=v(l)-v
Similarly we establish the -.75
.5 40$ rs.&/h. |
v(r 5) =-. 5
and -.25 values by answering the
following questions.
1 0 6-+ r 75
{r . 5 r 25}
{ .r7 5 *.5r |7 r 7 5 = 5 -IO rCjw
v(r 75 )=-.75
.75
O ir 25 V0 j r. 25 : id (a I
v(r 2 5) -.25
Result: S-shaped like normal cumulative function (see Figure B.2)
activity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Loue 0 . 1 -.84-.96 .
0 -.02 -.16 -. 50 -.84 -.96 -1.
*Boxed relations represent responses of the decision maker.
180
Q.2.
Q.3.
T -+ 1 1
. . 5
B.7.5 Component Value Function For Status Of Information
For Isotopic Separation
The purpose of this section is to assess a value function
for the attribute "status of information" for isotopic separation.
This attribute can take 9 discrete values (1 to 9) which have
been already ordered in an ordinal sense. The assessment of a
value function will provide a cardinal ordering for these
values.
We first define certain properties of the function.
A. MONOTONICITY. From the definition of the ordinal scale for
the status of information it follows that the value function
is monotonic i.e.
v(X)>v(Y) if and only if d(X)<d(Y)
where d(X) is the integer (1-9) corresponding to state X(A-I).
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B. CONVEXITY AND CONCAVITY
We consider changes in the status of information and
denote them by (i-l-i) meaning that the status of information
has changed from the state corresponding to (i-l) to the one
corresponding to (i). Then by comparing pairs of such
changes we want to establish which one involves the highest
change in the inherent difficulty.
For example, if
(i-li) iCi+l) then v(i)-v(i-l) < vCi+l)-v(i)
please answer the following questions:
Q.1. Cl - 2) (2 3)
Q.2. (2 3) < (3 4)
Q.3. (3 - 4) < (4 - 5)
Q.4. (4 - 5) (5 -+ 6)
Q.5. (5 - 6) (6 - 7)
Q.6. (6 - 7) (7 - 8)
Q.7. (7 -,- 8) > (8 9)
MONOTONIC: CONVEX CONCAVE Q S-SHAPED
NONMONOTONIC: SHAPE
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C. MIDVALUE SPLITTING TECHNIQUE
We set the value of 1 (or A) at 0 and the value of
9 (or I) at -1. Thus
l(1)=O and v(9)=-l
We now want to establish a value i of the status of infor-
mation such that the decrease in difficulty in going from 9 to
i is the same in going from i to 1.
Q.1. i9-K} L ' _) lj1
or equivalently define a state X such that
tI-*X3 a .X-Aj
S<i<6
x=5. 5
Since the status of information can take only integer
values it might not be possible to identify an i (X) that
satisfies Q.1. In that case we can define a noninteger value x
(i<x<i+l) and artificially put v(X)=-.50. After establishing
the value functions we can go back and check if the values v(i)
v(i+l) agree with the preferences of the assessor.
In the same way we establish the-.25 and-.75 points.
{9 Y}
or equivalently
.IY}[
?
define a state Y
I Y-X 
such that
v(Y)=-. 75
Q3. tizjQ.3. £i~*z1 i Z -*, 
or equivalently define a state Z
{ X.z}
such that
(A
v(Z) =-.25
Result:-Shaoed like normal cumulative function (see Figure B.3)
*Boxed relations represent responses of the decision maker.
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Q.2.
and
4<y<S
y=4.5
6<z<7
C ZG
z=6. 5
Status of
Information A D B E G C H F I
Value 0 -.01 -.05 -.16 -.37 -.67 -.84 -.95 -.99.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ _I
B.7.6. Component Value Function For Criticality Problems
For Isotopic Separation
The purpose of this section is to assess a value function
for the attribute "criticality problems" for isotopic separation.
Since this attribute can take only two values (HIGH LOW), we
simply assign the value of zero to the low level, and the value
of minus unity to the HIGH level. Thus
v(LOW) = 0 v(HIGH) = -1
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B.7.7 Assessment Of Weighting Coefficients (X's)
The answers to the following questions are needed for the
assessment of the weighting coefficients.
Q.1. If all the attributes were at their lowest level (z-,
i=l,. . . 6) and you had a choice of "pushing" only one
up to its highest value (see Figure B.4) which one would you
choose?
Answer: 4:
Q.2. Assess the level of stc\ul o inrYoiio for i oo 'c
separation for which you are indifferent between the
following two alternatives.
z =A z z z z z ~ Z 2z 4 Z1 ' ' ' ' 1 2' 3' ' 5 6}
Answer: z-- _
Q.3. Assess the level of z so that you are indifferent
between the following alternatives.
ZQ, Zc o0 V
1 2 3' 4' 6 1 2' , 4' 5' 6
Answer: z 4 = C
Q.4. Assess the level of z so that you are indifferent between
I Z z2' z3 *=LOW, z, z', z 
Answer:
Q.S. Assess the level of z 4
a z z * A, z
tzl1' Z3, Z4 =AS z5'
Answer: Not AP.c. ie-
Q.6. Assess the level of z 4
Z , Z -, Z) , Z *=1Z5
so that you are indifferent between
Zs tht yZ' Z , Z ,' Z,' Z 6
( z, =A)
so that you are indifferent between
Z Z2 z Z4 Z' Z 4 11 2 ' ' 4 ' 5 ' JZ6i
Answer: Z4 - C
Q.7. Assess the level of z so that you are indifferent between
z , z , , z , , 6 *=L
1· 2 'j· Z;· *.LO~ i c~ j' 2' z3' 4' 5 '6
Answer: _ =-4
k tx--ko I C- ok h iLN 'r '- 0 k, T 0 t') 
Z 2 Z , Z , , Z" ii 2' 3 4 ' S 6 36
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Using the developed value function, we assessed the
value of the inherent difficulty of various proliferation
pathways considered by SAI.- 2he pathways are given in the
Table on the following page,reproduced from an SAI working
paper. he assessment of the values of the attribute "scores'
for these pathways is given in Table B.2. The values of the
inherent difficulty are also given in the last column of the
same table. The ordinal ordering provided by SAI is given in
the table of page this ordering is compared in Table B.3
with the cardinal ordering resulting from the value assess-
ment. The two assessments are in very good agreement.
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TABLE B. 2
"Scores" of Inherent Difficulty Attributes for Various
Proliferation Pathways
COUTTmY B
CHEMICAL ISOTOPIC INHERENT
SYSTEM iStatus of. Radio Critical. Status Radio Critical.
Info. KActivity Probl. Inf Ac tiv ity robl. IICLT
1 A 1 LOW N.A. N.A. N.A. 0
2
_ _ _ _ 14 _ _ _ _
3 B 10 LOW N.A. N.A. N.A. -.12
44 E 10 LOW N.A. N.A. N.A. -.16
5 B 105 LOW N.A. N.A. N.A. -.14
6
7 N.A. N.A. N.A. F 1 HIGH -.40
8 B 102 LOW F 102 HIGH -.46
9 B 106 LOW F 102 HIGH -.57
10 B 106 LOW N.A. N.A. N.A. -.15
5 N.A. N.A. N.A.11 A 10 LOW -.12
12 A 104 LOW N.A. N.A. N.. -..1112 f A 10 LOW N.A.1 N.A. N.A.
(*) Case No. 4 corresponds to a less developed country
N.A. Not applicable
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TABLE B.3
Ordering of Pathways in Terms of Decreasing Inherent Difficulty
ED
It
191
'tOUR " SAI
ORDERING ORDERING
#9 (-.57) 8,9
#8 (-.46) 7
#7 (-.40) 10
#4 (-.16) 5,6
#10 (-.15)
#5 (-.14) 3,4
#3, 11 (-.12)
#12 (-.11) 11,12
#1 ( 0 ) 1
. ,
APPENDIX C
ON THE ATTRIBUTE "WARNING PERIOD"
C.1 Definition of Warning Period
One important factor that affects the choice of a
particular proliferation pathway by a would-be proliferator,
and hence the resistance of an alternative system, is the
likelihood that the proliferation effort will be impeded by
detection and subsequent "inside" (3) or "outside" intervention.
To address this aspect of the problem, we initially considered
as an attribute the warning time, proposed by SAI l and
defined as "the time from detection of an ongoing prolifera-
tion effort to the completion of the first explosive." The
conventional wisdom concerning the importance of this attri-
bute is that the more time available for intervention, the
higher the likelihood that the proliferation effort will be
aborted. However, it was soon recognized that there are two
fundamental deficiencies inherent in the conventional defini-
tion of this attribute. First, it could not be used for
comparison purposes, in the sense that two different pathways
with the same warning times are not necessarily equivalent as
far as the interruptability of the proliferation is concerned.
Second, even for a single pathway, the impact of the availa-
bility of a given warning time on the interruptability of
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the proliferation effort is not always clear. To illustrate
these two points we consider a scenario involving two pro-
liferation pathways with time-schedules as shown in Figure C.l.
Pathway 1 corresponds to an all-covert proliferation effort,
while pathway 2 corresponds to an all-overt effort. From an
examination of the two time-schedules it is clear that the
same value of the warning time has a different importance
for each pathway. For example, for pathway 1 a warning time
of a half year means (see Figure C.1) that the detection takes
place after subtasks 1 and 2 have been completed and after 1/3
of the fuel has been clandestinely diverted. The same warning
time (0.5 year) for pathway 2 means that the detection takes
place when almost 50% of the facilities are yet to be con-
structed and when no nuclear fuel has been diverted, Obviously,
the 0.5 year of warning time does not have the same "value"
for these two pathways.
The second problem with the warning time concerns
the meaning of its absolute value, even for a single pathway.
For example, if the detection of a proliferation effort,
scheduled as shown in Figure C.1 for pathway 1, takes place
one and a half years into the effort, we would say that there
is one year of warning time before the construction of the
first weapon. This of course assumes that the proliferator
will continue operating according to the schedule of pathway 1.
Most likely, however, the proliferator will not follow the
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Figure C.1
Pathway 1: All covert
Pathway 2: All overt
(preparation and divertion)
(preparation and divertion)
Point of Detection for Pathway 1 if Warning Time is 0.5y.
-- - - Point of Detection for Pathway 2 if Warning Time is 0.5y.
1
Y
y
0
L)
Figure C.2. Fraction of What
has been completed as a function
of time.
tD(years)
Figure C.3. Fraction of
remains to be done as a
What
function
of time. For 0.5 year of warning
time Y2>Y1 -
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TASK TIME SCHEDULE (years)
1 1 2 3 4 1 5,
1 R&D, Facilities-Weapon Design
2 Constraction of Facilities
3 Material Acquisition
4 Material Processing
5 Weapon Fabrication .
J , ,,, !. i _ . .,, ,
'
original schedule. His reaction can be anywhere between
aborting the effort to an all-out attempt to finish. Some-
where in-between, we might have an initial, temporary s-low-
down, with the intent to resume the effort at a later more
convenient time, when the "political dust will have settled."
From the above discussion we conclude that the time
remaining, according to the initial scenario, from detection
up to completion of the first explosive is not always a use-
ful evaluator of a pathway. We also conclude that the
importance of detecting a proliferation effort at a par-
ticular moment depends on what remains to be done rather than
on how much time was initially allocated to this remaining
task. We can, however, use the fraction of the proliferation
effort that remains to be completed at the moment of de-
tection as an evaluator of the vulnerability of the effort
to intervention.
We denote the fraction of the effort to be. completed
at the moment of detection by y, and call it warning period
A warning period of 0% means that the effort was undetected
and a warning period of 100% means that the effort is de-
tected right at the beginning. Furthermore, two proliferation
pathways, for a given system and country, having the same
warning period y are equivalent as far as their vulnerability
to outside intervention is concerned.
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To connect the warning period y with the time-to-
detection, tD, i.e., the time at which the detection takes
place as measured from the beginning of the proliferation
effort, we can establish a "production" function
y = P(tD) C.1
where y gives the fraction of the effort that has been
completed by the time of detection. Of course, we have that
P(O) = 0
P(T) = 1
and
y l-y = 1-P(tD), C.2
where T is the weapons development time. The function
yA = P(tD) is schematically presented in Figure C.2 for the
two pathways considered above, while the function y = l-P(tD)
for the same pathways is shown in Figure C.3.
If a production function is established, then for a
given warning period y we can determine the time-to-detection
(see Figure C.3), and then, from the time-schedule (see
Figure C.1), we know the exact state of the proliferation
effort at the moment of detection.
In a more detailed analysis, the attribute warning
period could be decomposed into a number of sub-attributes
to give it a better operational meaning. For example, the
proliferation effort can be thought of as requiring a
196
certain amount of labor (measured in man-hours or man-years)
and a certain amount of capital. The required labor could
be further decomposed into various types of labor (scien-
tific, skilled, unskilled). Similarly, the required amount
of capital can be decomposed into capital for equipment and
materials that can be acquired inside the boundaries of
the proliferating country, and in capital for equipment and
materials that must be imported. At any instant of the pro-
liferation effort the fractions of the various kinds of
labor and capital that have been already committed are known
(through time schedules of the form shown in Figure C.1).
If now we assign an importance coefficient to each of these
sub-attributes, the fraction y of the proliferation effort
that has been completed at each instant of time is equal to
the weighted sum of the completed fractions of the various
subattributes. In symbols,
y (tD) = i XiYi(tD) C.3
where y(t D ) denotes the fraction of the i-th sub-attribute
committed up to time tD and hi its importance coefficient.
Seen from another point of view y(t D) in Eq. C3 gives the
value of the work completed at time tD.
For the purposes of this research, however, it was
assumed that the decision maker(s) has an intimate knowledge
of the time-schedule of each pathway as well as of the
corresponding production function and hence, he (they) can
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completely and unambiguously understand the importance of
a particular warning period (as it is expressed in dimen-
sionless percentage form) with regard to what remains to
be done at the moment of detection. The meaning of the
warning period is further examined in the following sub-
section.
C.1.1 Importance of Warning Period (4)
In trying to establish the contribution of the
warning period to the resistance of a pathway, it is
necessary to assess the preferences of the potential pro-
liferator concerning various values of this attribute. The
first characteristic that we should establish is whether
the direction of the preference is always- the same over
the range of the attribute. In other words, is a shorter
warning period always preferred to a larger one or is the
opposite true? Intuitively, it would seem that a short
warning period would be more preferred to a larger one.
But this attitude is based on the assumption that upon
detection the effort is going to continue, and thus, the
"closer" one is to the end the better. On the other hand,
one could argue that if upon detection the effort is stopped
permanently, then the closer one was to the end the more he
has committed, and therefore, the higher the "loss" in
aborting the effort. Thus, one would prefer being "caught"
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Sanctions
Applied ?
Weapons
Completed ?
YES
Consequence Utility
c1 : Weapons & Sanctions ulcl)
c2 : No Weapons & Sanctions u(c2)
C3 : Weapons & No Sanctions u(c3)
c4 :No Weapons & No Sanctions u(c4)
c_ :No Weaoons & No Sanctions u(c,)
Figure C.4. Decision Tree for the Determination of the Utility of the Warning Period y.
u(y)
Figure C.5. Shape of Utility Function
for Warning Period for "Low" Sanctions.
Figure C.6. Shape of Utility Function
for Warning Period for "High" Sanctions.
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before committing significant resources, which implies that
a longer warning period is better than a shorter one. From
the above discussion, it follows that what is of paramount
importance for the establishment of a preference order for
the warning period is the probability that "the effort will
be stopped upon detection." This probability depends, in
turn, on the severity of the sanctions and on the probability
that the sanctions will be applied. We can understand this
situation better with the help of the decision tree shown
in Figure C.4.
The tree starts at the chance node 1 depicting the
randomness of the detection moment. Let y be the value of
a particular "warning period." The proliferator knows that
his efforts have been detected, and he knows that sanctions
might be applied. There are potentially two courses of
action( 5): (1) the proliferator can stop the effort
(alternative al) resulting in consequence c5 = No weapons -
No sanctions, after having committed enough "resources"
(political, economic, etc.) for completing l-y of the total
task; and (2) he might respond with a crash-effort (crisis
response) trying to complete his objective (alternative a2).
If he follows the second alternative he will encounter
chance node No.2, at which the sanctions might be applied
with probability pl(sly) or not applied with probability
l-pl(sly). If the sanctions are applied, then the proliferator
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will encounter chance node No.3 for achieving the objective
with probability p2(wly,s) and not achieving it with proba-
bility l-p2 (wly,s). If the sanctions are not applied then
again the weapons objective might be achieved, with proba-
bility p2 (wly,s) or not achieved, with probability 1-p2(wIy,9).
The y dependence in pl(sly) allows for the potential
dependence of international and regional responses on the
amount of the remaining effort. This dependence may be
important, if only in the eyes of the proliferator. For
example, there is a widespread belief that if y represents
only a part of the arsenal (meaning that some weapons have
been already acquired), then the response of the inter-
national community may be muted, since the proliferator
will have joined the club of the weapon-states. Furthermore,
possible regional adversaries may not respond either, in
fear of the existing weapons arsenal. The historical record
lends support to this conjecture. The y and s dependence
of P2 means that the probability of achieving the objective
depends both on what remains to be done and on whether
sanctions have been applied.
The consequences at the end of the tree are now ex-
pressed in a form such that the decision maker can easily
access their utility. If this is done, and we "fold back
the tree" by calculating the expected utility before each
chance node, we can calculate the expected utility for the
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two alternatives, a1 and a2. The proliferator will choose
the alternative with the highest expected utility, and this
is the utility u(y) of the "warning period" y. Thus,
u(y) = max [U(al),U(a2)]
If this procedure is repeated for all y's the utility
function u(y) can be assessed. Since the utility of the
consequences c1 to c4 is independent of y, what is needed
is the assessment of u(c5/y) as well as the assessment of
the functional dependence of P1 and P2 on y. Such a pro-
cedure could be tedious however, and a decision maker might
be able to assess u(y) directly keeping the above analysis
implicitly in mind. In principle, this requires that the
nature of the sanctions as well as the likelihood of their
application be well known. This is the rationale for in-
cluding potential institutional constraints in the definition
of an alternative system.
At the present state of the non-proliferation art,
the nature of the sanctions (let alone their applicability)
is not well defined. They are, however, of paramount
importance in assessing the utility of the warning period.
This became evident when two "decision makers" were asked
to assess their utility for the various warning times (from
the proliferator's point of view). The question of the
sanctions was left vague. Both agreed that the absolute
value of the warning time was not of great importance; what
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mattered was the fraction of the task that remained to be
done. The first assessed his utility function as mono-
tonically decreasing with y; i.e., the smaller the y the
better (see Figure C.5). The second decision maker felt
that there was a particular value y (slightly before the
acquisition of the first weapon) such that for y>yo the
larger the y the better, while for yy 0o the smaller the y
the better (see Figure C.6).
The basis for this difference of opinion hinges on
the assumed viability of sanctions. That is, the first
decision maker had implicitly assumed that sanctions would
be of little importance to the proliferator even if applied,
and/or that the probability of applying them is so small
that the proliferator would continue his efforts even if
he were detected. The second decision maker, however,
implicitly assumed that the sanctions were so severe and
their probability of implementation so high that detection
was in his mind equivalent to aborting the effort.
Although the exact form of the sanctions and the
conditions for their application are not well defined at
present, we can nevertheless include them parametrically.
Thus, we define three levels of sanctions (High, Medium,
Low) and two levels for the probability of applying them.
Specifying a combination of sanction level and application
probability will simplify the direct assessment of the
utility of the "warning period." In this way, the impact
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of the sanctions and their likelihood on the resistance of
the various pathways can be established. In the demonstra-
tion of the methodology presented in Chapter IV, however,
we considered only the "low-sanction" case.
C.2 Uncertainty Assessment for Warning Period
A proliferation effort can be detected at any instant
of its duration. The time-to-detection can, therefore,
vary from zero up to a value equal to the weapons develop-
ment time. To quantify the uncertainty of the time-to-
detection, we will treat it as a random variable. Since the
warning period is a function of the time-to-detection, it is
also a random variable. The probability distribution of
this variable reflects the detectability of the proliferation
effort and depends on the alternative system, on the country,
on the weapons aspiration and, of course, on the pathway.
For a given proliferation pathway it is easier to
assess the uncertainty in the time-to-detection tD than in
the warning period y. The latter can, however, be determined
from the former, since the two random variables are functionally
related. That is, the probability that the warning period
will be less than y is equal fo the probability that the
time-to-detection will be greater than tDo, where tDo is
determined by y and the production function P(tDo) such
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Figure C.7. Graphical Determination of Cumulative Distribution Function F(y) of
Warning Period.
z(t )
0 T-T
Figure C.8. Probability of detection at tD conditional on not have been detected by tD.
Diversion of Nuclear Fuel Starts at t=T-T . T : Duration of Diversion.
C c
205
t D
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I
I
I
t-
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
)
G(
I
-D
that
Yo = 1 - P(tDo) C.4
In symbols we have that
F(y) Pry<y o) = G(tDo) Pr{tD>tDOI C.5
This relation is depicted graphically in Figure C.7. There
are two ways in which G(tD) can be assessed:
(1) The decision maker can directly assess the probability dis-
tribution function, G(tD), of tD by determining the proba-
bility that tD will be greater than t for various t's. Usually
the assessment of 4 or 5 percentiles suffices for the
determination of G(tD);
(2) The decision maker chooses a mathematical model which he
feels best describes the way the detection probability changes
with time, and then he assesses enough percentiles (usually 1
or 2) for the determination of the constants in the model.
An example of the second approach follows.
The proliferation effort is divided into two periods:
(1) Period from time zero up to the moment the
diversion of fissile material begins.
(2) Period from the start of diversion up to the
completion of the objective.
It is assumed that during each period the conditional
probability that the proliferation will be detected between
t and t+dt, given that it has not been detected up to t, is
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increasing linearly with time (see Figure C.8). Then if
z(t) denotes this conditional detection rate we have that
klt D
z(tD) =
(kl-k2)T1 + k2tD
if O<t D<T-Tif T-TctDcT
if T-T <t <T
c- D-
where T = T-Tc and where Tc is the completion time, i.e.,
the time from the start of diversion of nuclear fuel up to
the completion of the first explosive. It can be shown that
G(tD) and z(tD ) are related as follows
tD
G(tD) = exp[-/ z(tD)dt D] C.7
By virtue of Eqs. C.5 and C.6 it follows that
2
2exp[ k1t]
G(tD) k2 t 2( D) k D (k2-kl)(T-Tc)2
exp [ 2 + (k2-k1 )(T-Tc)tD - 2
if O<tD<T-T c
-D c
if T-Tc<tD
c.8
It is noteworthy that G(T) $ 0 and hence, there is a finite
probability that the proliferation effort will be undetected.
For a particular proliferation scenario (system-country-
aspiration-pathway) the constants k, k2 can be determined
if the decision maker assesses the probability that the
effort will be undetected for a given period of time during
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c.6
each of the proliferation phases. For example, if he assesses
that the probability of not being detected after one year in
the preparation phase, is equal to A, then
A = G(1)
and from Eq. C.8 it follows that
k = -21n(A)
The assessed values of the constants k, k2, for the various
pathways considered in the example of Chapter IV, are given
in Tables C.1 and C.2. The probability distribution F(y)
for the warning period was derived by assuming a linear pro-
duction function, i.e., that y' = tD/T.
C.3 Utility Assessment
As discussed in Chapter IV and in Appendix A, choice
under uncertainty can be guided by introducing the concept
of utility. In this section we present a short introduction
to the basic fundamentals of utility theory excerpted from
[6] and discuss the idea of certainty equivalent. We also
provide a systematic procedure for the assessment of the
utility function for the attribute: warning period.
C.3.1 The Concept of Utility
Suppose for a moment that the warning period could
take only discrete values labeled Yl, Y2, '.., yi, ... Yn'
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TABLE C.1
Probability of detecting the proliferation effort by tD.
Preparation hase. (Pr tt , 0<t<T-T )
L D- J c
TABLE C.2
Probability of detection the proliferation effort by t'D
Diversion phase (Pr t'< t , 0< t <Tc )
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Covert Overt
I fD COUNTRY B COUNTRY C COUNTRY B COUNTRY C
(years)s) kl= 15y ikl=.30y 2 k1 .5y 1
1 7% 14% 20% 39%
2 26% 45% 59% 86%
3 50% 74% 87% 99%
4 70% 81% 97% 99.97%
COVERT OVERT
COUNTRY B COUNTRY C COUNTRY B COUNTRY C
tD LWR-U235 LWR-U235 LWR-ThLWR-Th WR-W 3 tDLWR-Pu LWR-PU
Recycle _ 2 Recycle 2 2
2=70Y 2 2.y k2=.40y k2=1.83 mths 2=8Y k2=8y 102y
1 30% 50% 50% 60% 1 18% 30%
2: 75% 94% 94% 97% 2 59% 76%
3 96% 99.9% 99.9% 99.97% 3 96% 96%
4 99.6% 99.999% 99.999% 4100% 4 99.65% 99.65%
Furthermore, suppose that the labeling is such that Y
corresponds to a warning period of 100%, yn to a warning
period of 0% and that Y1 is less preferred than Y2, which
is less preferred than y3, and so on. In symbols we assume
that
Y14 Y2 Y3( Yn C.9
where yi.Yj means that yi is less preferred than yj. Now
suppose that a decision maker is asked to state his preference
between pathways 1 and 2 where
1. Pathway 1 will result in warning period yi with proba-
bility Pi for i=l, 2, ..., n. Of course, Pi>O all i, and
Pi = 1.
2. Pathway 2 will result in warning period Yi with probability
pi, for i=1,2...n. Again p0 all i, and ip7=1. Next,
suppose that the decision maker asserts that, for each i,
he is indifferent between the following two options:
Certainty Options - Warning period yi.
Risky Option - Warning period yn (0%: the best warning
period) with probability ui and y1 (100%: the worst warning
period) with the complementary probability 1-ui.
Furthermore, the decision maker is consistent in that he
assigns un= 1 and u1=0, and the u's are such that
u1 < u2 < ... <u C.10n
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comparing (C.9) and (C.10) we can see that the u's can be
thought of as a numerical scaling of the y's.
We can now define the expected value of the u's as
U = i Pi ui
where Pi is the probability of yi and ui the utility of Yi.
The fundamental result of utility theory is that the expected
value of the u's can also be used to numerically scale
probability distributions over the y's. To illustrate the
reasoning let us reconsider the choice between pathway 1
(which results in yi with probability p) and pathway 2
(which results in yi with Pit). If we associate to each yi
its scaled u value then the expected u-scores for pathways
1 and 2, which we label by u' and u" are
u i P ui
and C.11
?= 'i Pi Ui
There are compelling reasons for the decision maker
to rank order pathways 1 and 2 in terms of the magnitudes
of u' and u". The argument briefly is as follows. Consider
pathway 1. It results with probability Pi in warning period
Yi' But i is considered by the decision maker as indifferent
to a ui chance at yn and a complementary chance at yl. So,
in effect, pathway 1 is equivalent to giving the decision maker
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a u' chance at Yn and a complementary chance at Yl' This
completes the argument, which rests heavily on the substi-
tution of the risky option (yn with ui, Yl with 1-u ) for
each yi'
Of course, this line of thought can easily be es-
tended to cases for which the warning period is not a
discrete variable but a continuous one, namely when it can
take any value between 0% and 100%. In that case, instead
of discrete probabilities, we have a probability density
function p(y) which gives the probability that the warning
period will take a value in a small (infinitesimal) interval
around y. Similarly, instead of discrete values u we have
a function u(y) that gives the utility of each y (see figure
C.5). If such a utility function is assessed, we can rank
order pathways 3 and 4 in Figure IV.4 with respect to the
warning period, by calculating the expected utility of this
attribute for each pathway. In this case, the expected
utilities are given by the integrals (extensions of Eq. C.11
for the continuous case)
1
u3 I P3(y) u(y)dy
0
C.12
1
u4 If P4 (y) u(y)dy
0
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and p3(y) and p4(y) denote the probability density functions
for pathways 3 and 4, respectively. The pathway with the
higher expected utility is the more preferred as far as
the warning period is concerned.
It is noteworthy that the utility approach is very
general, and that it includes as special cases situations
such as: (a) the decision maker feels that the only matter
of importance is not to be detected, and if detected he is
indifferent to when detection occurs. This implies that
the utility function has the form
0 if y 0 O
u(y) = C.13
1 if y = O
and hence, the expected utility u is equal to F(O), namely
the probability the the warning period will be equal to
zero; (b) the decision maker feels that the utility of the
warning period decreases linearly with its value, i.e.,
u(y) = 1 - y
This implies that u = 1 - y and, hence, that the shorter
the expected value of the warning period the more preferred
the pathway.
From the above discussion, it follows that if the
utility function of the warning period is assessed, then
for each pathway the expected utility could be calculated
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and used as the "score" for the attribute warning period in
Tables IV.1 to IV.12. Although such an approach would
provide us with a means of comparing two pathways with
respect to the warning period it is not very useful when
composite comparisons must be made. For example, a pathway
with an expected utility of warning period equal to 0.5 is
preferred to one with 0.4. However, this 0.1 difference
in expected utility might not be very meaningful when
compared to a reduction of 1 year in development time. To
remedy this situation, we can use the concept of certainty
equivalent.
C.3.2 Certainty Equivalent
As already stated, the key idea of the utility theory
is the idea of substitution, namely the idea that a decision
maker is indifferent between a certainty option yi and a
risky option yielding 0% with a certain probability and
100% with the complementary probability. We can generalize
this idea as follows.
Let p(y) be the probability density function de-
scribing the uncertainty about the warning period of a given
pathway, u(y) the utility function, u the expected utility, i.e.,
1
= I p(y) u(y)dy C.14
TO
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and y the value of y that satisfies the relation.
u(y) = u c.15
Then, the decision maker should be indifferent between a
certainty option yielding y and the risky option of the
pathway for which the value of y is uncertain because
these two options have the same expected utility. The
value y is called the certainty equivalent of the risky
option characterized by p(y).
If the certainty equivalent of the warning period is
calculated for all the pathways, we could replace each
pathway that includes uncertainty about the warning period
by a pathway that yields a warning period y for certain.
Of course, the values of the other attributes remain un-
changed. Such pathways are equivalent for decision-making
purposes. It follows, therefore, that we can fill in the
columns of warning period in Tables IV.l to IV.12 with the
corresponding certainty equivalents. Comparisons between
pathways are once more meaningful. For example, in pathway
2 and 3 Table IV.1, we can compare the reduction of the
development time from 2 to 1.5 years with the increase of
the warning period from 3% to 6%.
The details of the assessment of the utility function
for the warning period and the calculation of the certainty
equivalents are given in the following section.
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C.4 Utility Assessment of Warning Period
In assessing the utility function of the warning period
for the paradigm of Chapter IV, the following procedure was
followed.
C.4.1 Identification of the Relevant
Qualitative Characteristics
Two characteristics of the preferences of the decision
maker that are first assessed are those of utility independence
and monotonicity; i.e., we first examine whether the preferences
towards various uncertain values of warning period depend on
(6)
the level of the other attributes , and whether the pref-
erenceis constantly decreasing or increasing with the warning
period. Both these properties must hold for the certainty
equivalent technique (see Section C.3.2) to be applicable.
As discussed in Section IV.6, we can divide the
various proliferation pathways into two categories, namely
those involving chemical and isotopic separation of the
weapons material, respectively. Since pathways involving
the former differ significantly from those involving the
latter, in all the attributes, it is reasonable to check
whether the preferences of the decision maker towards the
warning period change as we move from one category to the
other. If the attitude does not change, then we can
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proceed in assessing the utility function without con-
sidering the level of the other attributes. If, however,
the preferences of the proliferator do depend on the
level of the other attributes we try to establish whether
the utility independence property holds within each ca-
tegory of pathways and if not, on which attributes it
depends and how.
From the analysis done up to date and the discussion
with various experts it appears reasonable that in
assessing the utility function of the warning period, two
regions should be distinguished.
Region I: This region covers the proliferation effort
from its start up to the beginning of the production
of the first weapon. If yl denotes the fraction of
the work remaining to be done - at the moment of de-
tection - up to the beginning of the production of
weapons, then
Y1 = 1.0 means"nothing has been done"', and
Y1 = 0.0 means"production of first weapon has
just begun".
Region II: This region covers the proliferation
effort from the start of the weapons production to
the completion of the arsenal. If Y2 denotes the
fraction of the arsenal not completed upon detection, then
Y2 = 1.0 means"production of first weapon has just
begun" and
yo = 0.0 means"the arsenal is completed".
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Thus, two utility functions, one for each region of the
warning period, are first assessed and then these indi-
vidual assessments are combined to cover the whole range
of the warning period.
In what follows an alternative pathway will be
denoted by (xl,x2,x 3,x 4,x5), where the xi's denote the
attributes weapon-development time, warning period, in-
herent difficulty, weapons material and monetary cost,
respectively. Whenever there is no ambiguity about the
levels of the other attributes we will denote a pathway
as ( . . x 2 . .).
C.4.2 Utility assessment for Region I
First the utility of the various levels of warning
period corresponding to detection prior to the construc-
tion of the first weapon is assessed. The assessment is done
for country B having aspiration ac2
C.4.2.1 Checking for utility independence
Keeping the levels of the attributes xl, 3,x 4,x5
constant, the decision maker is asked in each of the
following questions the alternative that he prefers. Each
question involves a choice between a risky option
(a lottery yielding one of two possible values each with
a probability .5 )and a certainty option.
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For questions Q.1 through Q.5 it is assumed that
the attributes have the following values:
x,=2 .5 years, X 4 =R.G-Pu x5=
$20 million
Sample
ResponseQuestion
..5
5 (
or T=(...,0.02,...)
.,0.0,.. .)
for sure
.5
Q.2 L=/
.5
Q.3 L=/
\.5
(.
or S=(...,0.95,...) for sure
(.
or R=(...,0.50,...) for sure
.5
Q.4 L=
Finally,
(. 1. ,
or Q=(...,0.10,...) for sure L
(. . ,0.0,.
we ask the decision maker to determine the level
of the warning period y 5 for which he is indifferent
between
.5 (2.5,1.0,(.M/-),
Q.5 L-/
.5 (2.5,0.0,(M/-),
RG-Pu,20)
RG-Pu,20)
and I=(2.5,...,(M/-), RG-Pu,20)
= 0.05
We now consider a pathway that requires spent fuel
reprocessing and uranium enrichment. For this pathway the
attributes have the following values
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PREFER
-T
L
L
be-
y 5
x,=$300 million
These values are kept constant for the following questions.
.5
Q.6 L-=/
\. 5
(.
(.
or T=(...,0.01,...)
.. ,0.0,* .) for sure
.5
Q.7 L=
.5
Q.8 L=/ 
\ .5
.5
Q.9 L= 
(
(.
or S=(...,0.98,...)
..,0.0,. ..)
or R=(...,0.50,...)
(
(. 
(. 
for
for
sure
sure
,0.0,. .
,l.0,. .
or Q=(...,0.08,...) for sure
.,0.0,. . . )
Finally, we ask the decision maker to determine the
level of the warning period y.5 for which is is indifferent
between
.5
Q.10 L=
.5
(6,1.0, (M/H),HE-U233,300)
(6,0.0, (M/H),HE-U233,300)
and I=(6,.
= 0.05Y'5
If the answer to questions Q.5 and
..,(M/H),RG-Pu,20)
Q.10 are the same we
ask the decision maker whether he feels that this is
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T
L
L
X1=6 years, x4HE-U233,
( . . . I 1 . 0 3 . . . )
I
accidental or whether the value y5 does not depend on the
levels of the other four attributes. If the answer is that
Y.5 does not depend on the level of the other attributes, then
we ask if he feels that preferences under uncertainty for the
warning period depend on the levels of the other attributes
in any way. If the answer is no then utility independence has
been established. If the answer to any of the above questions
is yes, then we try to identify regions (subspaces) of the
attributes for which the utility independence property holds.
The whole analysis is then repeated for each such subspace.
C.4.2.2 Checking for monotonicity
The question of monotonicity was discussed at length
at the end of Section C.1 (see also Figure C.5). For the
purposes of this assessment it was assumed that the condi-
tions that assure monotonicity are satisfied.
C.4.2.3 Attitude Towards Risk
The following questions are designed for the assess-
ment of the decision maker's attitude towards risk. In
other words, we want to establish whether the decision maker
is risk averse, risk prone or risk neutral( ? ) Operation-
ally, this means that for a monotonically decreasing utility
function its shape will be convex, concave or linear, re-
spectively. Since utility independence has been established,
the questions refer only to the warning period.
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.5
L1 =
.5
-5
L2 = /
5
L3 5
.5
L4 =
L 5
.5L5 = /
_ .5
L6 -/
L = 
L7 
.5
.5
L\-.5
0.20
or y=0.10 for sure
0.0
0.30
or y=0.20 for sure
0.10
0.40
or y=0.30 for sure
0.20
0.50
or y=0.40 for sure
0.30
0.60
0.40
or y=0.50 for sureor y-0.0
0.70
or y=0.60 for sure
0.50
0.80
or y=0.70 for sure
o.60
0.90
or y=0.80 for sure
0.70
PREFER INDIFFERENT
L Y
v
V/
/
V
ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK:
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C.4.2.4. Specification of Quantitative Restrictions.
In this part of the assessment we specify several
points of the utility function. These points along with
the properties identified thus far, provide a very good
basis for our analytical definition of the utility func-
tion.
The decision maker is asked to specify the levels of
warning period that establish indifference in the following
cases.
y
1.0
and Y.5 for sure y = 0.05
where u(l)-0, u(O)=l and u(y 5)=.5
and Y. 75 for sure Y 75= o.02
where u(y.75)= .75
.5
L 3 /
.5
1.0
and Y. 25 for sure y,25 =2 .P:
where u(y 25)= 25
The implications of these assessments are shown schema-
tically in Figure C.9.
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Figure C.9. Utility Function for Figure C.10. Utility Function for
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Figure C.11. Renormalized Utility Function for the two Regions of Warning Period.
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C.4.3 Utility Assessment for Region II
The assessment of the utility function for region II
is completely analogous to that for region I. Similar
questions were asked and utility-independence and mono-
tonicity have been established. The risk attitude and
the quantitative restrictions, however, were different and
are presented in the following two subsections respectively.
C.4.3.1 Utility independence holds
C.4.3.2 Utility functions monotonically decreasing
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C.4.3.3 Attitude
.5
L1 = 
.5
.5
L2 5
5
.5
L3 .
.5
L4 =
L 5
L6 =/:
= .5
.5
L8 =/
.5
0.20
0.0
0.30 .
PREFER INDIFFERENT
L Y
or y=0.10 for s
or y=0.20 for s
0.10
0.140
or y=0.30 for s
0.20
0.50
or y=0. 40 for s
0.30
0.60
or y=0. 50 for s
0.140
0.70
or y=0.60 for s
0.50
0.80
0.60
0.90
0.70
or y=0.70 for s
or y=0.8 0 for s
ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK:i 
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C.4.3.4. Specification of Quantitative Restrictions.
The decision maker is asked to specify the levels of
warning period that establish indifference in the following
cases.
y
1.0
L 1 =
.5
and Y. 5 for sure
0.0
where u(.l1)-O, uCO)-l and u(y 5 )=.5
.5
L2 =
.5
and Y. 7 5 for sure
0.0
where u( 75 )=.75
.5
*5
1.0
and Y. 2 5 for sure
Y.5
where u(y25 )=25
The implications of these assessments are shown schema-
tically in Figure C.10.
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C.4.4. Renormalization of Utility Function.
Once the utility function is determined for each
region of the warning period, y, a renormalization that
will produce a utility function over the whole range of
y can be performed as follows:
(1) The utility of 2=0 is set equal to 1.
(Y2=O0 means that the arsenal is completed without
detection)
(2) The utility of yl=l is set equal to 0.
(y1l=l means detection at the very beginning of the
effort)
(3) We set u1 (0) = u2(1)
(since Yl=0 & Y2=1 denote the same warning period,
i.e. beginning of weapons production).
(74) The decision maker is asked to specify the probability
X for which he would be indifferent between
(Y 2 = ) complete
arsenal
L =
1, (y1 = 1) detection at
and I= (y = 1) for sure
(starting weapons produc-
tion)
the eginning
The utility function form that complies with the as-
sessed qualitative and quantitative restrictions as well as
with conditions (1) to (4) above is the following
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1 YY2)6 for 0< < 1
u(y)= <
e-yyl-5 for O-Y1 < 1
The parameters a,~,y,6 can be evaluated as follows. Conditions
(3) and (4) above, provide two relations involving a;,y,6.
Two more relations can be provided by using the assessed
mid-value points i.e. the points Y2 and y for which
u(y2=1) + u(y2= 0)
2 2u(Y2) : 2
and
u(Yl=l) + u(yl=0)
u(Y ) - 2
These two equations along with the relations resulting from (3)&(4)
above i.e.
1 a )_
= ii
-d = Tr
e
provide a system of four equations that can be solved for
a,S,y,6. The numberical assessments for the paradigm of
this work are given in Table C.3 and in Figure C.11.
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TABLE C. 3
PARAMETER VALUES OF
THE UTILITY FUNCTION FOR ASPIRATIONS
a1 and a.2
ASPIRATION
r1 (* ) t2
a N.A. 1.28
N.A. 6.58
y 6.93 13.86
6 0 0 .22
(*) For aspiration a , region
does not exist
II
230
APPENDIX D
COMPLETENESS AND NONREDUNDANCY OF THE
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE ATTRIBUTES
D.1 General Remarks
In this Appendix we compare the set of the prolif-
eration resistance attributes that we developed in Chapter III
against other sets of attributes that have been proposed by
various parties. After the definition of each proposed
attribute we comment briefly on the relation of the attribute
to the set of attributes proposed in this study.
D.2 List of Attributes
D.2.1 Proposed by R. Rochlin, Non-Proliferation Bureau,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
1. IAEA warning time: time between IAEA announcement of an
illegal act and availability of first explosive.
Comment. This attribute is included in the warning period (#5).
It pertains to a particular aspect of an alternative system,
i.e. the one in which the IAEA will be responsible for con-
firming the detection of an ongoing proliferation. A given
set of institutional arrangements (the ones presently existing
or others) will affect the probability that the detection
(or, if necessary, the confirmation of the detection) of the
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proliferating activity will take place at a given instant,
and hence will affect the probability that the detection
will take place when a certain proportion of the task has
yet to be completed.
2. Dedicated action time: the period during which a would-
be proliferator could--as a result of appropriate intelligence--
be caught in a compromising position prior to the availability
of first explosive.
Comment. This attribute is included in the warning period (#5).
If it is assumed that a detection can take place only during
a part of the development time or, in general, that the prob-
ability of detecting an illegal action is higher during a
particular period of the development time, then the length
of this period affects the probability distribution of the
warning period and hence its expected utility. Thus, the
length of the dedicated action period is included in the
assessment of the probability distribution of the warning
period.
3. Cost: Direct cost of nuclear explosive program.
--Resources at risk if the explosives program
results in the loss of power reactor operations.
Comment. Same as #2 monetary cost. In particular, compon-
ents 2.1 and 2.3.
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4. Complexity: technical failure modes; observables that
could permit detection of clandestine activities.
Comment. Technical failure modes affect the degree of in-
herent difficulty in the weapons material procurement (#3)
and in the fabrication of the weapons (#4). The "observables"
affect the probability distribution of the warning period (#5).
5. Military value: production rate of nuclear explosives
after the first weapon, weapon usability: yield, yield
uncertainty, weight, etc.
Comment. According to the problem-structure proposed in
this methodology, the production rate of nuclear explosives,
and to a certain extent their usability, are part of the
nuclear weapons aspiration and hence, constant over the
various pathways. However, the degree of difficulty with
which the postulated rate of production and usability are
achieved varies from pathway to pathway. This difficulty is
measured by the type of fissile material used. A finer dis-
tinction of the weapons' usability within the general cate-
gorization defined in the weapons aspiration is certainly
possible. This might involve a more detailed consideration
of the isotopic concentration of the fissile materia. It
is felt, however, that such a distinction is not necessary
for the present level of analysis.
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D.2.2 Proposed by H. Rowen, School of Business,
Stanford University
6. Accessibility to explosive materials measured in:
(6.1) resource inputs; (6.2) facilities; (6.3) people;
(6.4) money.
Comment. (6.1), (6.2), (6.4) and (6.3) are included in the
monetary cost (#1). (6.2) and (6.3) affect the inherent
difficulty of fissile material procurement (#3, See also
Appendix B).
7. The time from a safeguarded state to the possession
of various numbers of weapons.
Comment. For a given nuclear weapon aspiration this is the
weapon development time (#1).
8. The time from various decisions to the possession
of weapons.
Comment. These are the various components of the weapon-
development time.
9. The time for converting signals of illicit acts into
usable "warning."
Comment. This time affects the probability distribution of
the warning period (#5). This is because the probability of
a particular warning period depends on the probability that
a signal will be generated at a particular instant and on
the time necessary for converting this signal into usable
"warning. "
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10. Various response or action times: these are the times
required for various governments, in the region and outside,
to take serious possible actions in response to signals of
dangerous moves.
Comment. These times will affect the relative "value" of
the various warning periods for the proliferator. Thus, such
times will affect the preferences of the proliferator about
the various warning periods and hence, they are implicitly
accounted for. For more details, refer to Appendix C.
11. Estimates of material stocks and flows, including the
number and characteristics of weapons that might be produced.
Comment. The number and general characteristics of weapons
are constant for all pathways since they are part of the
nuclear-weapons aspiration. Therefore, the material stocks
and flows influence the rate at which material must be
diverted to meet a particular time constraint and these two
(rate and duration of diversion) influence in turn the prob-
ability distributions of the warning period and the length
of the development time.
12. Risks, dangers, and technical uncertainties associated
with various programs to acquire weapons.
Comment. These factors are included in the inherent difficulty
of the fissile material procurement (#3) and the difficulty
in the weapons design and fabrication (#4).
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13. The assured "legal" constraints. These will define the
legitimacy of various activities, facilities, and materials
of various kinds: criticality experiments, research reactors,
spent fuel stocks, fresh fuel stocks, hot cells, etc. These
constraints need to be defined in terms of their universality;
i.e. whether different activities will be permitted in
different countries.
14. Characteristics including scale of possible covert or
ambiguous (i.e. those with civil and military functions)
facilities.
Comment on 13 and 14. In the proposed structure of the
problem, the assessment of the proliferation resistance of
a particular pathway conditional on a combination of an
alternative system and a specific country assumes specifica-
tion of the institutional constraints, including, what it
is legal and what it is not. Because of differences among
various countries a particular pathway of a given alternative
system may be characterized by completely different values
of the five attributes, and hence may represent different
degrees of resistance to different countries. Furthermore,
differences in resistance may arise not only from possible
differences in attribute values, but also from differences
in preferences and value trade-offs among these attributes
for different countries.
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D.2.3 Proposed by T. Greenwood, Department of Political
Science, M.I.T., and Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy (OSTP)
Greenwood proposes the formation of four clusters of
nuclear fuel cycles by comparing them to a "benchmark" case,
using as criteria:
15. Cost.
16. Difficulty.
17. Time.
18. Warning time.
Comment. These four criteria are in effect four of our five
attributes.
D.2.4 Compiled by Science Applications, Inc. (SAI)
19. Direct cost of weapon/arsenal.
Comment. Contained in monetary cost (#2).
20. Indirect costs.
Comment. Contained in monetary cost (#2).
21. Political costs.
Comment. These costs depend on whether the proliferation
effort has succeeded or not. If it has succeeded the cost
will be incurred via sanctions and similar hostile reactions.
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Basically, this response follows from the fact that nuclear
weapons have been acquired, and not on the particular path-
way through which they were acquired. If the effort has
failed, the political cost might include the resources
already committed. This is reflected in the utility of
various warning periods (see Appendix C).
22. Resources at risk.
23. Economic risk.
Comment for 22 and 23. Same as for #21. They also affect
the cost (#2).
24. Time from decision.
Comment. Included in weapon development time (#1).
25. IAEA response time.
Comment. See #4 of this list.
26. Dedicated response time.
Comment. Affect probability distribution and utility of
warning period (#5, Appendix C).
27. Time from material acquisition.
Comment. Affects probability distribution of warning
period (#5).
28. Warning time.
Comment. See warning period (#5).
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29. Time to detection.
Comment. See warning period (#5).
30. Lead time.
Comment. See warning period (#5).
31. Susceptibility to international controls.
Comment. Affects the probability distribution of warning
period, i.e., the more controls the larger the expected
warning period.
32. Interruptability.
Comment. It is reflected in the probability distribution
and utility of warning period.
33. Sanctionability.
Comment. This is part of the institutional arrangements.
For a given system it has the same effect on all pathways.
34. Sensitive activities.
Comment. See comments on #13 and #14 of this list.
35. Institutional arrangements.
Comment. The institutional arrangements are part of our
alternative system definition. The values of the attributes
for the pathways and the preferences about them may have a
strong dependence on the institutional agreements.
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36. Non-proliferation standard agreements
Comment. See #35 of this list.
37. Precedent for future technologies: As a first
approach to the problem we will examine only the nuclear
technologies that can be significantly deployed within
the next 30 years (1980-2010). For a later time period
(i.e. 2010-2050), the analysis can be repeated with sys-
tems that may be available at that time. It is note-
worthy that the analysis of systems for the first time
period might yield different results if repeated for
another time-period. This is basically due to changes
in the technological and economic status of various
countries.
38. Legal starting point: Affects the probability dis-
tribution of the warning period (#5).
39. Probability of detection:
Comment. Affects the probability distribution of warning
period.
40. Probability of success
Comment. Implicitly included in the inherent difficulty
of the fissile material procurement (3) and in the
difficulty in the design and fabrication of the weapons
(#4).
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41. Key steps to produce weapon material
Comment. Included in the inherent difficulty (#3)
42. Facilities required per reactor
Comment. Affects the inherent difficulty (3)
43. Amount of material in fuel cycle
Comment. Given that the material is sufficient for
achieving the weapons objective, the amount of fissile
material will affect the probability distribution of the
warning period in the following two ways: (a) for a
fixed diversion period, the rate of diversion (and hence,
the probability of detection) is lower for larger amounts
of material in fuel cycle; (b) for fixed rate of diver-
sion (fraction of nuclear fuel) the lower the amount of
fissile material in the cycle the longer the diversion
period and hence the higher the detection probability.
44. Material unattractiveness
Comment. Attribute #4, weapons material
45. Material accessibility
Comment. Included in the inherent difficulty and partly
in the probability distribution of the warning period.
46. Material modifiability
Comment. Included in the inherent difficulty.
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47. Safeguardability
Comment. Affects the probability distribution of the
warning period (#5)
48. Rate of clandestine diversion
Comment. Affects the probability distribution of the
warning period (#5). See also #43 of this list.
49. Difficulty of material acquisition.
Comment. This is the inherent difficulty of fissile
material procurement (#3).
50. Protectability
Comment. Included in the inherent difficulty and in the
probability distribution of the warning period, i.e.
the better the protection the higher the probability of
detection.
51. Weapons usability
Comment. Attribute (#4) and nuclear weapon aspiration.
52. Detectability
Comment. Included in probability distribution of warning
period (#5).
53. Ease of Circumvention
Comment. See #52 of this list
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54. Complexity
Comment. Included in the inherent difficulty (3).
55. Facility modifiability
Comment. Included in the inherent difficulty (3) and
in the probability distribution of the warning period
(#5), i.e., the greater the need for new facilities,
the higher the detection probability. it also affects
the cost and time attributes.
56. Need for sensitive technology
Comment. Affects the inherent difficulty (#3)
57. Military value
Comment. See #51 of this list
58. Likelihood of detection
Comment. See #52 of this list.
59. Visibility
Comment. See #58 and 52 of this list.
60. Activity risk
Comment. Included in inherent difficulty of fissile
material procurement and difficulty in weapons design
and fabrication.
243
61. Specialized skills and knowledge
Comment. Included in inherent difficulty.
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APPENDIX E
VALUE FUNCTION ASSESSMENT OVER THE
PROLIFERATION-RESISTANCE ATTRIBUTES
E.!. General Remarks.
In this Appendix we present an example of a value
function assessment over the proliferation resistance
attributes (see Chapter III). The purpose of this func-
tion is to provide a numerical measure of the relative
attractiveness of the various proliferation pathways
to the would-be proliferator. It is assumed(8) that the
attributes are mutually preferential independent (see
Appendix A) and hence, that the value function has the
additive form
5
v(x1x2'x3'x4x 5)= Xivi (x )i=l
Since the attribute inherent difficulty is expressed in
terms of six sub-attributes (see Appendix B) the above
equation becomes
v(xl,x2,x31 ,x32,...,x36,x4,x5)= A1v(x) + 2v2 (x2 ) +
6
3jv3j (x3 )+ XAv4(x4  + X 5() E.
j=1
2 45
where X, + 2 - X + A +5 =
2 j=1 4 5
1 E.la
The procedure consists of two steps. First, the compon-
ent value functions v. are assessed in sections E.2 to
E.6, respectively. Next, the weighting coefficients
Xi's are assessed in section E.7. In section E.8 we
discuss the results of this quantitative analysis, and
compare them with the results of the qualitative analysis
of section IV.6. Finally, we present some concluding
remarks in section E.9.
E.2. Component Value Function for Weapon-Development
Time.
The purpose of this section is to assess a value
function for the attribute: weapon-development time.
Four separate assessments are made corresponding to the
following four sets of conditions.
(1) Weapons aspiration
(2) Weapons aspiration
(3) Weapons aspiration
(4) Weapons aspiration
The assessment was made for
section IV.2). Examination
al & "Business as usual"
environment.
a1 & "Crisis" environment.
a2 & "Business as usual"
environment.
a2 & "Crisis" environment.
a country of type B (see
of Tables IV.1 to IV.6
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reveals that the minimum development time is 1 year and
the maximum 6 years. The range of this attribute was,
therefore,
C0 X < 6. E.2
First,the properties affecting the "shape" of the value
function were explored.
A. Monotonicity. For all four sets of conditions it
was determined that the value function was monotonic.
This follows from the fact that shorter weapon develop-
ment times were always preferred to longer ones. Mathe-
matically this means that
x < x implies vl(x{) > vl(x). E.31 -1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 
for all x 's .
B. Convexity and Concavity. The shape of the value
function can be determined if the following questions
are answered. "For each of the following pairs of
changes in the weapon development time establish the
one that corresponds to a larger change in the value
of this attribute."
Q.1 (O to 1) - (1 to 2)
Q.2 (1 to 2) r (2 to 3)
Q.3 (2 to 3) - (3 to 4)
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Q.4 (3 to 4) > (4 to 5)
Q.5 (4 to 5) > (5 to 6)
The same questions were repeated for all four sets of
conditions, and in all cases it was determined that the
shape of the value function was concave (see Figure
E.1).
C. Numerical Assessment of Value Function -- Midvalue
Splitting Technique. We set the value of 0 years of
development time at zero, and the value of 6 years of
development time at -1, i.e.
v1(0) = 0 and v1(6) = -1 E.4
The midvalue splitting technique consists in assessing --
by relevant questions -- the levels of the development
time that have values -.50, -.75, -.25. This is done by
considering two particular levels of the attribute, and
then asking the decision maker to identify a third level
that divides this interval into two intervals of "equal
value". For example, if x 5 is the level of development
time for which the decision maker feels that the reduc-
tion in the value associated with going from 0 to x
years of development time is equal to the reduction in
the value associated with going from x 5 to 6 years,
then we have that
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v (0) - vl(x 5 ) = l (.5) - V1 (6) E.5
and by virtue of Eq. E.4 it follows that
vl(x 5 ) = -.50. E.6
Similarly, we can ask the decision maker to assess the
x 25 and x 7 5 levels. Of course, more points can be
established if we continue subdividing the value inter-
vals. Once a set of points is obtained, a mathematical
curve can be fitted through these points. Then, the
values of the x 2 5 ' x 5 0, and x 75 points are calculated
from the mathematical expression for the curve and
checked against the initial assessments. If gross des-
crepencies exist, the decision maker is asked to recon-
sider any assessments that constitute logical inconsis-
tencies, a new curve is produced, and so on, until a
mathematical form is found that adequately represents
the preferences of the decision maker.
In our example, the x 50, x 2 5 and x 75 points
were assessed four times; once for each set of condi-
tions. The mathematical form of the function that best
approximates these assessments for all four cases is
v1(x1) = exp[-x] - 1 E.7
The levels of the midvalue points and the corresponding
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TABLE E.1
Initial -.25, -.50, and -.75 value assessments and final
values for the weapon development time under various conditions
value of for each set of conditions are given in Table
E.1. The resulting value functions are given in Figure
E.1.
E.3. Component Value Function for Warning Period
In Appendix C, we assessed a utility function
for the attribute : warning period. Since a utility
function is also a value function we will use the util-
ity function assessed in Appendix C as the component
value function(9) for the warning period. These functions
are repeated here for convenience.
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DEVELOPMENT TIME (Years)
VALUE Aspiration a Aspiration a2
"Business "Business
as usual" "Crisis" as usual" "Crisis"
0 0 0 0 0
-.25 0.50 0.50 33 1.25 0.75
-.50 1.50 1.00 3.00 2.00
-.75 3.00 1.66 5.50 3.00
-.1 6.00 6.00 6.oo 6.00
0.49 0.83 0.23 0.35
2 3 4 5
(years)
Figure E.i. Component Value Function for Development Time.
Country B.
1. "Business as usual" Environment & a-Aspiration
2. "Crisis" Environment & al-Aspiration1
3. "Business as usual" Environment & a2-Aspiration2
4 . "Crisis" Environment & a2-Aspiration
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3.50
D.75
L. 0
O 6 7
_
-YX2(1) Aspiration al: Value function v(x 2 )= e -i E.8
where y = 6.93
.-a(x)B E.9a
(2) Aspiration a2: Value function v2 (x2)= E.2
e-YX2-6-i E.9b
where a = 1.28, B = 6.58,
= 13.86, 6 = .22
where Eq.9a corresponds to the warning period before com-
pletion of the arsenal, given that fabrication of the
first explosive has begun, and Eq.9b corresponds to the
warning period before the fabrication of first weapon.
(See also Appendix C, Section C.4.4.)
The decision makers involved with this assess-
ment asserted that the same value function holds for
both a "business as usual" environment and a "crisis"
environment. It should be noted, however, that this does
not mean that the contribution of a particular warning
period to the value of a pathway is the same under a
"business as usual" and a "crisis" environment. This
contribution is given by X2 v2 (x2 ) (see Eq. E.1). Hence,
although v2(x2) is the same for both environments the
weighting coefficient changes. (See section E.7.)
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E.4 Component Value Function for Inherent Difficulty.
As discussed in Appendix B, in order to assess
a value function over the attribute inherent difficulty,
we need to decompose it into six sub-attributes. The
component value functions corresponding to these sub-
attributes have been assessed in Appendix B. The same
functions will be used here.
E.5. Component Value Function for Weapons Material.
As discussed in Section III 3.4, this attribute
can be quantized in four distinct levels corresponding
to the-nature of the fissile material: (a) Reactor
Grade Plutonium; (b) Weapons Grade Plutonium; (c) Highly
enriched U-233; and (d) Highly enriched U-235. The
relative values of these four levels were directly
assessed by the decision makers, and are given in Table
E.2 for the various sets of conditions.
E.6. Component Value Function for Monetary Cost.
In this section we assess the component value
function for the attribute: monetary cost. Four sep-
arate assessments were made as in the case of attribute:
development time. (See section E.2.) The range of
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TABLE E.2
Value of the various weapons materials
(1) Difficulty associated with the construction of a2
weapons with RG-Pu small; and (2) Difficulty associated
with the construction of a2 weapons with RG-Pu large.
this attribute expressed in millions of dollars is
0 < x 5 < 700 E.10
First the properties affecting the shape of the value
functions were determined.
A. Monotonicity. The decision makers asserted that
lower costs are always preferred to higher costs.
Monotonicity, i.e.,
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VALUE
(1) (2)
Weapons a1 a2 a2
Material
U-235 0 0 0
U-233 -.25 -.15 -.10
WG-Pu -.50 -.30 -.20
RG-Pu -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
x < X5 always implying v5(x ) > v5(x5)
was thus established.
B. Convexity and Concavity. The decision makers, by
answering the following questions under the four sets
of conditions, established the shape of the component
value functions.
"Compare the change in value associated with
the following pairs of cost increases." (Cost in $M.)
Q.1 (0 to 100)
Q.2 (100 to 200)
Q.3 (200 to 300)
Q.4 (300 to 400)
Q.5 (400 to 500)
Q.6 (500 to 600)
It was determined that
< (100 to 200)
-.11 (200 to 300)
< (300 to 4oo00)
(400 to 500)
(500 to 600)
(600 to 700)
the value function
convex for all four sets of conditions (see Figure E.2).
C. Numerical Assessment of Value Function - Midvalue
Splitting Technique. We set the value of zero cost
at zero and the value of 700 $M at -1; i.e.,
v5(0) = 0 and v5(700) = - 1 E.11
Next, the levels of the cost having -.25, -.50, and -.75
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is
values were assessed using the midvalue splitting tech-
nique as was done for the development time attribute
(see Section E.2.C). The assessments of these levels
are shown in Table E.3. The curves fitted to these
TABLE E.3
Cost levles of -.25, -.50 and -.75 values for various sets
of conditions
ASPIRATION a1
"Business
as usual"
0
150
250
350
700(1)
2.6x10-4
1.37
"Crisis"
0
200
300
375
700(2)
1x105
1.90
COST ($M)
"Business
as usual"
0
250
400oo
575
700
1.96x10-4
1.30
"Crisis"
0
350
500
625
700
3.48x10-6
1.91
(1) For aspiration al1 and a "business as usual" environ-
ment, it was assumed that v5 (x5 ) = -1 for x5 > 415$M.
(2) For aspiration al and "crisis" environ-
ment it was assumed that v5(x5 ) = -1 for x5 > 430$M.
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VALUE
0
-. 25
-. 50
-.75
-1.00
aC
__· T
A 11 Am  -IAT
AI) nAJ- IU 4 
ii_
10
0
($ millions)
4
1
Figure E.2. Component Value Function for Cost.
Country B.
1. "Business as usual" environment
2. "Crisis" environment
3. "Business as usual" environment
4. "Crisis" environment
& al-aspiration
& al-aspiration
& a2-aspiration
& a2-aspiration
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).25
).75
points have the form
v5 (x5) = -a( 5) E.12
The values of the parameters ac, for the four sets of
conditions are given in Table E.3 and the corresponding
functions are shown in Figure E.2.
E.7. Assessment of the Weighting Coefficients.
In this section we present a method for assessing
the weighting coefficients ('s) in Eq.E.l. The basic
idea is to ask the decision maker to identify several
pairs of pathways that have the same resistance, and
therefore the same value. For each pair (x',x") of path-
ways that have the same resistance, it follows that
v(x') = v(x") E.13
Replacing v(x) in Eq. E.13 with the expression given
in Eq.E.1, we obtain one equation relating the X's. The
objective is to establish enough pairs of equally pre-
ferred pathways that will yield, via E.13, a sufficient
number of equations that can be solved for the X's. Of
course, this is an evolutionary procedure. Once, the
first set of X's is obtained, more pairs of equally
preferred pairs of pathways are established, and their
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value -- using the derived X's -- can be calculated to
check for consistency. If there are major differences
between the preference relations directly assessed by
the decision maker and those suggested by the calculated
v(x), then the 's are reestimated using another set of
indifference assessments. This procedure is repeated
until a set of X's is evaluated that the decision maker
feels adequately represents his preferences.
As discussed in Section E.1, there are 10
weighting coefficients that must be calculated. How-
ever, relations among six of these, namely among those
corresponding to the inherent difficulty attributes, are
already available. (See Appendix B.) We can therefore
express any five of the inherent-difficulty 's in terms
of the sixth and thus, we have reduced the 10 unknowns
to 5. If we establish four relations of the form of
Eq.E.13, then these four together with Eq.E.la will
provide a set of five equations that can be solved for
the five unknowns. This procedure is now presented for
various sets of conditions.
E.7.1. Case-Study I: Country B, Aspiration al,
"Business as Usual" Environment.
In the questions that follow, a proliferation
pathway is denoted by the values of the five attributes
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as (xl,x2,x3,x4,x). The attribute of inherent difficulty,
whenever included in a trade off, will be represented
by one of the sub-attributes, namely the one that changes.
In all other instances the common value of the inherent
difficulty will be denoted by a ---.
The first question involved trade-offs between
the warning period and the status of information for
isotopic enrichment. The following pathway (I) is con-
sidered:
I = (6 years, 0%, C, U-235, 350$M)
i.e., a proliferation pathway is considered that:
(a) will take 6 years; (b) will not be detected (0%);
(c) is characterized by a level C status of information
for isotopic enrichment (there is no radioactivity or
criticality problems involved); (d) requires the enrich-
ment of uranium in U-235; and (e) will cost 350$M.
Then, the decision maker is asked to assess the status
of information for pathway II given by
II = (6 years, 30%, ?, U-235, 350$M)
such that he would be indifferent between I and II
(I II). Since such questions might not be easy to
answer directly,(l°) a step-by-step procedure, including a
series of questions as given below, can be used.
We ask the decision maker to compare the following
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pairs of pathways. In practice, each pair is suggested
by the answer to the preceding question.
Pathway I Pathway II Answer
(6, 0%, C, U-235, 350) ? (6, 30%, A, U-235, 350) I II
(6, 0%, C, U-235, 350) ? (6, 30%, G, U-235, 350) I > II
(6, 0%, C, U-235, 350) ? (6, 30%, D, U-235, 350) I II
(6, 0%, C, U-235, 350) ? (6, 30%, B, U-235, 350) I > II
The answer to the last question was that I is slightly
preferred to II. Since there is no level of the status
of information between D and B, in order to increase the
value of pathway II to make it equally preferred to path-
way I, we started decreasing the level of the warning
period. Finally indifference was achieved for the fol-
lowing pair.
(6, 0%, C, U-235, 350) (6, 25%, B, U-235, 350)
Expressing the values of these two pathways in terms of
Eq.E.1 we get
X2V2(0) + X3 4v34(C) = X2v2(.25) + 34v34 (B)
or that
v (B) - v4(C)
2 v2(0) - v2 (.25) 3 4 E.142 v2() - v2(.25) 3 
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(11)Similarly we established the following indifferences:
(1, 30%, C, U-235, 350) (6, 7%, G, U-235, 350)
or that
v2 (.3) - v2 (.07)
!1 v (6) = V l(1) 2; E.15
(6, 30%, C, U-235, 10) (6, 5%, C, U-235, 350)
or that
v2 (.3) - v2(.05)
5 v5 (350) - v5 (10) 2;
E.16
and
(3, 30%, C, U-235, 350) (3, 15%, C, RG-Pu, 350)
or that
v2(.3) - v2(.15) .
4- v4 (RG-Pu) - v4(u -235) 2 E.17
Since the component value functions for the various
attributes are known, equations E.14-to-E.17 provide
four numerical relations for the 's. These relations
when combined with Eq.E.la and the known ratios of the
inherent-difficulty 's yield the numerical values pre-
sented in Table E.4.
E.7.2. Case Study II: Country B, Aspiration a2,
"Crisis' Environment.
Under these conditions, we established by prelim-
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inary questions that the most important attribute was
the development time. Thus, the questions in this case
involved a large change in one of the attributes and
the decision maker had to adjust the level of development
time that achieved indifference. The following four
pairs of equally resistant pathways were established.
(6, 30%, A, U-235, 350) X (1, 30%, C, U-235, 350)
(6, 0%, -, R.G-Pu, 20) X (2, 30%, -, R.G-Pu, 20)
(6, 30%, -, R.G-Pu, 10) X (3, 30%, -, R.G-Pu-350)
(6, 30%, -, U-235, 350) X (4, 30%, -, R.G-Pu, 350)
The resulting 's are given in Table E.4.
E.7.3. Case Study III: Country B, Aspiration a,
"Business as Usual" Environment. Small
Difficulty Associated with RG-Pu as Weapons
Material.
Under these conditions it was established by pre-
liminary questions that the most important attribute
(i.e. the one that the proliferator would try to reduce
first)() is the status of information for the isotopic
enrichment. Thus, the questions initially involved a
large change in the level of an attribute and then, the
decision maker was asked to compensate this change by
adjusting the level of the status of information for
isotopic enrichment. Here, as in Case I, in order to
accommodate for the relative inflexibility associated
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with the discrete nature of the levels characterizing
the status of information we had to vary more than one
attributes to achieve indifference. The following
four pairs of equally resistant pathways were established.
9 9
(6, 20%, A, U-235, 580) X (6, 0%, C, U-235, 580)
9
(2, 20%, C, U-235, 580) X (6, 20%, G, U-235, 580)
(3, 20%, -, R.G-Pu,100) X (3, 5%, -, R.G-Pu,500)
9
(4, 20%, -, R.G-Pu,100) X (4, 20%, -, U-235, 600)
The resulting X's are given in Table E.4.
E.7.4 Case Study IV: Country B Aspiration a2,
"Business as Usual" Environment. Large Diffi-
culty Associated with R.G-Pu as Weapons Material
Under these conditions it was established that
(12)the most important attribute is the weapons material.
The main difference between this case and the previous
one, lies in the shifting of the relative weight among
the attributes that evaluate the technical difficulty
of the proliferation effort. Thus, in this case the
following pairs of equally resistant pathways were esta-
blished.
9 9
(6y, 20%, C, U-235, 580) X (6y, 0%, A, R.G-Pu, 580)
9
(6y, 20%, A, U-235, 580) X (6y, 0%, G, U-235, 580)
(2, 20%, C, U-235, 580) (6y, 20%, , GU-235, 580)
(5, 20%, -, R.G-Pu, 100) X (5, 5%, -, R.G-Pu, 500)
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The resulting X's are given in Table E.4.
E.8. Resistance Value of Pathways.
Before calculating the "values" of the various
pathways using the results of Sections E.2 to E.7 in
Eq.E.l, the decision maker was presented with Table E.4
to determine whether the calculated X's were in agree-
ment with his preferences. Each Xi is a measure of the
importance of the corresponding attribute with respect
to the others. If we consider the most resistant path-
way, i.e., the pathway that has all the attributes at
their lowest level, and therefore, has a value of -1
(see section E.1), then the X's give the fractions of
the total resistance attributable to the corresponding
attributes.
We note, for example, that for case I (i.e.,
aspiration al1 and "business as usual" environment),
if a pathway requires both chemical and isotopic separ-
ation and if all the attributes have their worst pos-
sible values the contribution of the inherent difficulty
to the overall resistance of this pathway is 58%(13) of
the total and thus, it is by far the major contributor
to the resistance. The inherent difficulty remains
the major contributor to the most resistant pathways
that involve only chemical or only isotopic separation
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TABLE E. 4
WEIGHTING COEFFICIENTS (X's) OF
ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTION FOR FOUR CASE STUDIES
ATTRIBUTE
DEVELOPMENT TIME
WARNING PERIOD
Status of
Information
Radioactivity
Criticality
Status of
Information
Radioactivity
Criticality
W7APONS MATERIAL
COST
1
32
33
34
X35
x3 6
x4
A5
CASE II CASE III
.13
.15
.18
.08
.01
.20
.08
.03
.03
.11
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.31
.07
.17
.08
.01
.20
.08
.03
.01
.04
.15
.17
.16
.07
.01
.19
.07
.03
.06
.08
.13
.14
.13
.06
.01
.15
.06
.03
.21
.08
I
N
H
E
R
E
N
T
D
I
F
F
I
C
U
L
T
Xl
C
H
E
M
I
C
A
L
I
S
0
T
0
P
I
C
x CASE I CASE IV
-
.
.
of the fissile material. Thus, the most resistant path-
way involving only chemical separation has a value of -.69
[-1.-(-20-.08-.03)] and the contribution of the
inherent difficulty is 35% (= 27). Of course, this
does not mean that for any pathway the inherent diffi-
culty will always be the major contributor. The contri-
butions of the attribute will also depend on their level.
For instance, a pathway having all the attributes
except the weapons material in their "best" levels will
have a resistance that is wholly attributable to the
weapons material. The decision maker agreed with these
remarks, and said that the 's in Table E.4 generally
express his feelings about the relative importance of
the various attributes. Continuing in this fashion,
cases I and II were compared next. In this case, the
decision maker said that for a crisis environment the
inherent difficulty remained an important contributor,
but now an equally if not more important factor was
the development time. In a "crisisT environment the
importance of warning period, cost, and weapons material
was judged to be marginal. These attitudes are expressed
by the 's calculated for case II. Finally comparing
cases III and IV, (Sec. E.7.3 & E.7.4) the decision
maker said that he felt that the major difference lay
in the change of the difficulty associated with R.G-Pu.
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He said that for case IV this difficulty is of the same
order as the difficulty associated with the procurement
of the fissile material. This attitude is reflected in
the X's for case IV.
Next, the assessed component value functions
and the weighting coefficients were used along with
Eq. E.1 to evaluate the relative resistance value of
the various pathways of the three systems considered
in Chapter IV. The scores of the attributes for the
pathways are given for a country of type B in Tables
IV.1 to IV.6. The corresponding scores for the inher-
ent difficulty attributes are given in Tables E.5 to
E.7.(14) The resistance value of each pathway was cal-
culated for the four sets of conditions presented in
section E.2, and the results are presented in Tables
E.8 and E.10.
Table E.8 gives the values of the pathways for
the three systems for country B, having aspiration a1
under two environments: "business as usual" and "crisis".
The value of system IV (independent pathway) is also
given in this table as the 10th pathway for each system.
From the values of the various pathways in Table E.8,
we conclude that the least resistant pathways of systems
I, II and III for a "business as usual" environment
are no. 2, no. 2, and no. 6, respectively. The corres-
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TABLE E.5
"Scores" of Inherent Difficulty Attributes
System: LWR-Once Through- Reactors
Country :
Only- Light Sanctions
D
N.W. Aspiration a1 or a2
* Not Applicable
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Pathway Chemical Isotopic
No Descri Statu  Radio Crit. Status Radio rit.
No. . of activ.Prob. of activ. Prob.
Info.(rad/hr) Info. (rad/hr)
1 C-C-SF B 1l0 L N.A.* N.A. N.A.
2 C-O-SF B 10' L N.A. N.A. N.A.
3 O-O-SF B 10' L N.A. N.A. N.A.
4 C-C-FF N.A. N.A. N.A. C 0 L
5 C-O-FF N.A. N.A. N.A. C 0 L
6 O-O-FF N.A. N.A. N.A. C 0 L
7 I B 104 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
8
9
10
TABLE E.6.
"Scores" of Inherent Difficulty Attributes
System: LWR-Denatured Thorium- Reactors only- Light Sanctions
Country: B
N.W. Aspiration: a or a2
* Not Applicable
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Pathway Chemical Isotopic
Statu Radio rit. tatus Radio Crit.
No. Descript. of activ. rob. of activ.Prob.
Info. (rad/hr) Enfo. (rad/hr_
1 C-C-SF B 106 L N.A.* N.A. N.A.
2 C-O-SF B 10 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
3 0-O-SF B 10 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
64 C-C-SF B  L C 102 L5 C-C-SF B 106 L C 102 L
6 25 C-O-SF B 10 L C 10 L
6 O-O-SF B 106 L C 102 L
7 C-C-FF B 102 L C 102 L
8 C-O-FF B 102 L C 102 L
2 29 O-O-FF B 10 L C 102 L
10 I B 10 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
TABLE E.7
"Scores" of Inherent Difficulty Attributes
System: LWR- Pu- Recycle- Reactors Only (Pre-Irr.MOX)-Light Sanction
Country : B
N.W. Aspiration : a1 or a2
* Not Applicable
270
Pathways Chemical Isotopic
Statu Radio Crit. Statu Radiol Crit.
of activ. Prob. of activ.Prob.
No Descript. Info. (rad/hr) Info. (rad/hr)
1 C-C-SF B 105 L N.A.* N.A. N.A.
2 C-O-SF B 105 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
3 O-O-SF B 105 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
C-C-FF B 10 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
5 C-C-FF B i0 L N.A. N.A. N.A.5 C-O-FF B 10 L N.A.  
6 O-O-FF B 10 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
4
7 C-C-FF B 10 L C 0 L
8 C-O-FF B 10 L C 0 L
9 O-O-FF B 10 L C 0 L
10 I B 10 L N.A. N.A. N.A.
TABLE E. 8
RELATIVE RESISTANCE VALUE OF
VARIOUS PATH WAYS OF SYSTEMS I TO III
(see Tables IV.1 to IV.3)
271
COUNTRY B : ASPIRATION al
"Business As Usual" "Crisis"
PATHWAY-
SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
I II III I II III
1 -.235 -.238 -.235 -.363 -.337 -.363
-.226
2 -.2-.22 -.229 -.360 -.363 -.360
3 -.237 -.240 -.237 -.340 -.343 -.340
4 -.424 -.431 -.196 -.507 -.566 -.316
5 -.418 -.429 -.191 -.505 -.566 -.314
6 -.448 -.461 -.179 -.511 -.576 -.271
7 --- -.371 -.512 --- -.501 -.588
8 --- -.369 -.510 --- -.500 -.586
9 --- -.411 -.531 --- -.510 -.589
System
IV -.203 -.203 -.203 -.380 -.380 -.380
TABLE E. 9
ORDERING OF SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF
DECREASING PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
Country B, Aspiration a1
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BUSINESS AS USUAL CRISIS
VALUE ORDER VALUE ORDER
SYSTEM
I -. 226 2 -. 340 3
SYSTEM
II -.229 1(X2) -.343 2(X3)
SYSTEM
III -.179 4 -.271 4
SYSTEM
IV -.203 3 -.380 1
pending pathways for the "crisis" environment are:
no. 3, no. 3 and no. 6. These results are in exact
agreement with the results drawn from the "qualitative"
examination of the pathways using the ideas of dominance
and extended dominance (see section IV.6, Tables IV.13
and IV.15). The resulting "ordering" of the systems
shown in Table E.9 is, of course, exactly the same as
that obtained after the analysis of section IV.7(1 5)
(see Tables IV.17 and IV.19).
Table E.10 gives the resistance values of the
various pathways of the three systems, for country B,
having aspiration a2, operating under a "business as
usual" environment and for two different assumptions:
(a) Small difficulty associated with the construction
of a2 weapons with Reactor-Grade Plutonium; and
(b) Large difficulty. For the former, the least resis-
tant pathways for systems I, II and III are, respectively,
no. 2, 3 and 6. These results are not in agreement with
the results obtained from the "qualitative" analysis
presented in section IV.6. According to that analysis
the corresponding least resistant pathways are no. 2,
2, and 5 (see Table IV.13). The first discrepency
occurs with system II. The decision maker was confronted
with this inconsistency, and after careful examination
of pathways 2 and 3 (see Table IV.4), he asserted that
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3 is less resistant than 2. The rationale was the fol-
lowing. In going from 2 to 3 we experience a decrease
in the resistance because of the decrease in the devel-
opment time, and increases in the resistance because of
the increases in the warning period and cost. From the
quantitative assessment it follows the difference in the
resistance value of $30 million and $50 million is
negligible (.001). The decision maker agreed that
that is exactly how he feels. For country B and a2 -
weapons this difference in cost should not be of any
importance. Then the question is whether the reduction
of one year (2.5 to 1.5) in the development time is
worth more or less than a decrease by .01 (.03 to .02)
in the warning period. After some thought he said that
he would prefer the reduction in the development time.
This attitude was consistent with the quantitative
assessment and thus, pathway no. 3 is less resistant
than pathway no. 2. For similar reasons he asserted
that for system III (see Table IV.5) pathway no. 6 is
less resistant than pathway no. 5.
From Table E.10 we conclude that for "large
R.G-Pu difficulty" the least resistant pathways for
systems I, II and III are no. 5, 8, and 6, respectively.
From Table IV. 11 we see that the result of the corres-
ponding qualitative analysis was that the least resistant
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TABLE E. 10
RELATIVE RESISTANCE VALUES OF
VARIOUS PATHWAYS OF SYSTEM I AND III
FOR COUNTRY B AND ASPIRATION a2
(See Tables IV.4 to IV.6)
275
SMALL RG-Pu DIFFICULTY LARGE RG-Pu DIFFICULTY
PATHWAY
No. SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
I II III I II III
1 -.294 -.341 -.294 -.408 -.447 -.408
2 -.258 -.271 -.258 -.378 -.390 -.378
3 -.261 -.264 -.261 -.380 -.383 -.380
4 -.428 -.451 -.214 -.359 -.338 -.341
5 -.417 -.438 -.219 -.349 -.377 -.345
6 -.427 -.451 -.210 -.360 -.387 -.337
7 --- -.392 -.521 --- -.338 -.441
8 --- -.384 -.508 --- -.332 -.429
9 --- -.397 -.512 --- -.342 -.434
SYSTEM
IV -.228 -.228 -.228 -.229 -.229 -.229
TABLE E.11
ORDERING OF SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF
DECREASING PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
Country B, Aspiration a2
Small RG-Pu Difficulty
VALUE
-.258
-.264
-.210
-.228
ORDER
2
1(2)
4
3
Large RG-Pu Difficulty
VALUE
-.349
-.332
-.337
-.229
ORDER
1
3
2
4
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SYSTEM
I
SYSTEM
II
SYSTEM
III
SYSTEM
IV
. I
I
pathways are no. 5, 5, and 8. Examination of pathways
8 and 5 of system II (see Table IV.5) revealed that the
difference in the resistance of these two pathways con-
sists of the difference in the inherent difficulty asso-
ciated with the chemical separation and the difference
in the cost. Pathway no. 5 requires "hot" chemistry
while pathway no. 8 requires almost "cold" chemistry
(see also Table E.6). When the decision maker compared
this difference in the inherent difficulty with the $60
million difference in the cost, he asserted that the
former resistance is of greater value than the latter,
and that he should have chosen pathway no. 8 in his
"qualitative" analysis. For system III (see Table IV.6),
the decision maker admitted that he had chosen pathway
no. 8 by excluding all pathways that had R.G-Pu as
weapons material. After examining the implications of
the quantitative assessment he asserted that, although
the difficulty associated with R.G-Pu in pathway no. 6 is
greater than the difficulty associated with the uranium
enrichment of pathway no. 8, the difference in the values
of the other attributes is so overwhelmingly in favor
of no. 6 that once more he agreed with his quantitative
assessment.
Based on these least resistant pathways the
ordering of the systems is as shown in Table E.ll.
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The ordering for "small R.G-Pu difficulty" is identical
to the one obtained from the qualitative analysis in
spite of the difference in the least resistant pathways
(see Table IV.18). For "large R.G-Pu difficulty" the
ordering resulting from the quantitative analysis dif-
fers from that resulting from the qualitative analysis,
the main source of the difference being the different
pathway representing system III.
E.9. Concluding Remarks.
In this Appendix we have presented a demonstra-
tion of the application of the quantitative techniques
of multi-attribute value theory in the assessment of
the proliferation resistance of an alternative system
in a given country having a particular nuclear weapons
aspiration. Such quantitative analyses should provide
useful insight into the factors that affect the differ-
ential proliferation resistance of alternative systems,
as well as a means of checking qualitative analyses for
consistency. Care must be taken, however, in inter-
preting the results of such an analysis. The resulting
"composite" measures should be viewed critically and
always in conjunction with a qualitative analysis. The
resistance value of an alternative system is a useful
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tool in comparing systems among themselves and not as an
end in itself. Finally, the existence of preferential
independence must be verified before an additive form
for value function is used for a particular subspace
of the attribute space.
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NOTES ON THE APPENDICES
1. The symbolism xi indicates that xi is a random vari-
able; x denotes a multivariate random variable.
2. Another way of looking at this is that certainty
is a special case of uncertainty.
3. For example, in a situation where a weapons program
is being carried out in a democracy, without the know-
ledge of groups inside and outside the government who
would oppose such an effort.
4. This subsection requires a familiarity with the
concept of utility. A short introduction to utility
theory is presented in Section C.2.1.
5. Others can be easily added in a more detailed model.
6. For a detailed definition of utility independence
see Appendix A.
7. For a complete definition of these terms see [6].
8. This assumption was verified for our example by a
procedure similar to the one described in Appendix B
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for the inherent difficulty attributes.
9. Since choice under certainty (where value functions
are used) is a special case of choice under uncertainty
(where utility functions are used), a utility function
is always a value function. This is true because
x' Tx" if and only if u(x')< u(x"). See also Appendix A.
10. Here we have an additional difficulty stemming from
the descrete nature of the levels of the status of
information.
11. The question mark indicates the attribute that was
adjusted to achieve indifference.
12. It is reminded that the most important attribute
is the attribute that the decision maker feels contri-
butes the most to the resistance of a pathway.
13. To be more precise, this contribution is .58/.97= .60,
since such a pathway involving enrichment will have as
weapons material U-235, and thus a total value of -.97.
(X3 6 u3 6 (U235) = 0)
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14. It is assumed that the inherent difficulty depends
only on the type of pathway and not on the aspiration.
Thus, the inherent difficulty of pathways No. 1 in
Table IV.1 and No. 4 in Table IV.4, etc. is the
same.
15. In a complete quantitative analysis, a value func-
tion expressing the point of view of the international
community should be assessed and the systems would be
ordered in terms of the values of their least resistant
pathways obtained using this value function and not the
proliferator's value function. For the demonstration
purpose of this report, however, this was not necessary.
For this particular example the order would not have
changed regardless of the form of the new value function
because of dominance considerations.
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